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Abstract 
Since their inception ride-sourcing companies have disrupted the traditional taxi 
markets with their digital platforms and match-making algorithms. However in the 
previous hundred years the incumbent taxi companies had become protected by national 
legislation which aimed to maintain public order and safety. Despite the well-developed 
regulation on taxi market the legislation has not been clear whether ride-sourcing is 
legal or not. This is what the new players such as Uber have been exploiting with their 
aggressive expansion strategies when trying to win the race on network effects.  
This thesis studies the regulative landscape of ride-sourcing phenomenon in Finland and 
the three law making processes in 2015–2020. It summarizes how the regulation 
changed from the ride-sourcing platform point of view and uncovers the legitimation 
strategies Uber used when establishing a subsidiary in Finland already before the first 
reform of the law on transportation in 2018. It matches the strategies to the ones 
previously identified in the literature and gives insight how disrupting technology 
company has tried to affect the law makers in order to create a legislation which would 
ultimately grant ride-sourcing regulative legitimacy.  
The results of the study tell the story of how the closed taxi market in Finland has 
opened up to welcome ride-sourcing platforms after a few missteps. Second it 
demonstrates how the IT legitimacy taxonomy by Kaganer et al. (2010) can be used to 
understand the legitimation strategies of a private organization during a law making 
process in the hopes of establishing regulative legitimacy in the future. Finally it reveals 
that while the regulation has changed to more favourable for ride-sourcing, the battle is 
far from over and new disputes are looming around the corner.  
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1. Introduction 
Taxi services or more specifically known as hire a car with driver services have been 
highly regulated almost right from their inception in early 1920s (Frankena & Pautler, 
1984). The regulation was introduced to maintain social welfare and public safety to a 
wild-west like market but also led to a closed market where entry licenses were scarce, 
prices flat and profit was steady for the incumbent players (Dempsey, 1996). In most 
countries this status quo had been present for decades before the advent of Internet, 
smartphone and GPS at the beginning of new millennium. For a while nothing seemed 
to change: people still hailed taxi from the street or called to dispatch center for a ride 
and then waited for the car for an unknown amount of time as they had used to. You 
could not rate your service and because of the closed market, could not really choose or 
even change the provider either. 
Then new players started to innovate hire a care with driver services that combined the 
technological breakthroughs of the last few decades (Wilson & Mason, 2020). You 
could order the ride from your phone with a few taps, track the location and the 
estimated arrival time of the car and finally pay with the same application at the 
destination without the need for physical cash or credit card. Aside from the convenient 
order and payment user experience, the innovators also introduced trust by adding the 
possibility to rate the level of received service and made the ratings public for everyone 
(Tyndall, 2013). All this could be done relatively cheap thanks to the development of 
cloud services (Arutyunov, 2012). 
However the new contestants had to overcome a couple of major hurdles: regulation and 
incumbents (Frazzani, Grea & Zamboni, 2016) . Only licensed companies could offer 
taxi services and in order to comply, the company had to first acquire an existing taxi 
license and then fulfil a number of clauses in the regulation. The incumbents were of 
course not too happy about the new technology since it would introduce a competitive 
disadvantage for them and possibly require new investments that would eat the steady 
profit. These hurdles made the costs of entering the market usually too high and would 
eat the financial benefits of the technological advancements (Thelen, 2018).  
The new business model did not require new players to own cars or hire drivers in the 
same sense as the incumbents (De Stefani & Aloisi, 2018). This gave an opportunity to 
present themselves as technology companies who were not offering taxi services but a 
two-sided marketplace where sellers (ride service providers) and buyers could meet. 
Clearly they were not subject to the taxi regulation since it only applied to companies 
offering taxi services and they were not one (Frenken, 2017). Or at the very least the 
regulation should change.  
From an investor point of view this offered a lucrative opportunity: what if one platform 
could establish market leadership with the help of network effects and the regulation 
would eventually have to change? This has led to the current state where major ride-
sourcing platforms such as Uber are raising absurd amount of capital in order to make 
high risk bets by pouring money into marketing and lobbying law-makers in order to 
gain regulative legitimacy and final approval for their business.  
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The plan is simple. Enter into new areas despite the regulative situation. Trust that the 
service’s reputation and user experience will become accepted by the public and then 
pressure law-makers to make the required adjustments to the legislation (Frenken, 
2017). The political decision makers cannot easily turn a blind eye on these attempts 
because the public’s opinion if they want to stay in the office. This has proven to be an 
effective go-to-market strategy so far. 
To answer the market pressure the regulative landscape on taxi market has been hastily 
adjusted by either deregulating existing laws or creating entirely new category of law in 
order to allow the ride-sourcing businesses to operate. In many occasions the rushed 
nature of the legalization has created a new set of problems for example in consumer 
safety, worker rights and unfair competition. Recently the academic studies have 
produced results about how the deregulation attempts of enabling ride-sourcing 
platforms has affected to taxi market and society in general (Flores & Rayle, 2017; 
Tzur, 2019). However the actual legitimation process has not received the same 
attention. This study aims to fill the gap in that area by looking into three different law 
making processes in Finland between 2015 and 2020 and to answer the following 
questions: 
How the ride-sourcing platforms are regulated in Finland and what kind of legitimacy 
strategies they use to gain regulative legitimacy? 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. First, I build the theoretical foundation by 
conducting a literature review. The aim of the literature review is to understand how the 
sharing and especially ride-sourcing economy has been described in the current 
literature and how the economy has evolved to date.  In addition, I review research on 
legitimacy as a lens through which I can study the hurdles of ride-sourcing industry 
more carefully and the strategies the companies use to overcome those hurdles. Next, I 
present the research methodology, followed by the findings of the thesis. In the findings, 
I will present the results of the research in two parts: first the regulative landscape in 
Finland from ride-sourcing platform point of view and the different strategies Uber used 
during three different law processes. Finally I discuss the findings against the previous 
literature and conclude the thesis.  
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2. Literature review 
This thesis focuses on ride-sourcing economy through the lens of regulative legitimacy. 
To understand the landscape and scope, the research starts by describing the sharing 
economy phenomena in general and defining the key terms to help the reader in the 
midst of the diverse terminology. I then delineate how the sharing economy works in 
hire a car with driver segment and what kind of regulative pressures it faces. Finally I 
move to the concept of legitimacy and what does it mean in building new businesses. I 
then select the regulative legitimacy of the four identified categories in the literature and 
use it as a lens to study the clash of the ride-sourcing platforms and incumbent taxi 
companies. Finally I clarify the present situation by outlining the regulation of the 
traditional taxi industry in order to understand how significant effect it has had to the 
current regulatory landscape regarding ride-sourcing platforms. 
2.1 Sharing economy 
Sharing economy, also known as collaborative, on-demand or gig economy, has become 
an accepted term for “economic activity that involves individuals buying or selling 
usually temporary access to goods or services especially as arranged through an online 
company or organization” (Merriam-Webster, 2020). It encompasses multiple sectors 
and has become more and more popular globally in recent years (Dervojeda, Verzijl, 
Lengton, Rouwmaat, Monfardini & Frideres, 2015). In addition for being spread in 
many businesses, sharing economy has variety of definitions. Case study by European 
Commission (Dervojeda et al., 2015, p. 3) defined it as “companies that deploy 
accessibility based business models for peer-to-peer markets and its user communities”. 
On the other hand Frenken et al. (2015) defined it as “consumers granting each other 
temporary access to under-utilized physical assets ‘idle capacity’, possibly for money”. 
Later studies have distinguished sharing economy from second-hand economy where 
permanent access is given to the asset instead of a temporary one (Frenken & Schor, 
2017). These examples indicate definition of sharing economy differ whether it is 
looked from business or consumer point of view. 
Because of the multi-faceted nature of sharing economy, a number of studies have been 
made in an attempt to find coherent definition for the phenomenon (Frenken & Schor, 
2017). Oh & Moon (2016) tracked the history of the sharing economy concept through 
practitioners and suggested a framework that could be used to identify businesses based 
on four criteria: social relationship-based open accessibility, trust, value creation and 
peer to peer transactions. However they did not offer a new definition as such. Another 
study (Pachenkov & Yashina, 2017) focused on the new characteristics of sharing 
economy and defined them as “p2p sharing & ICT based economy”. They conclude that 
the ICT development and changes in social and cultural patterns has made it possible for 
new relations to emerge between existing economies and around different axes such as 
profit, trust and security, ethics, control and power, ethics and production/consumption. 
But they too did not offer any new definition to the sharing economy phenomenon.  
The systematic literature review by Schlagwein, Schoder & Spindeldreher (2019) 
supports the interpretation about divided understanding on the definition due to the 
differing perspectives. They identified four categories from the existing definitions of 
sharing economy. While actors represent the users or peers in the economy who can act 
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both as buyers and as service providers, there also exists an important intermediary, a 
commercial or non-commercial organization or individual who acts as a facilitator. The 
second category is the process of sharing between the peers. The consensus was that in 
the sharing economy the ownership of the resource or asset does not change as the result 
of the sales transaction. In the third category the authors evaluated the transacted 
resource. Generally it was found that the resource can be physical goods or services and 
their capacity is somehow underutilized. The last identified category was infrastructure 
which was seen as the key part of sharing economy and main reason to its recent growth 
thanks to the development of the Internet and other IT infrastructure services. Based on 
the above categorization Schlagwein et al. (2019, p. 13) were able to offer the first 
consolidated definition for the sharing economy: “the sharing economy is an IT-
facilitated peer-to-peer model for commercial or non-commercial sharing of under-
utilized goods or service capacity through an intermediary without transfer of 
ownership”. This thesis focuses on the intermediaries who provide technology that 
enables sharing a resource temporarily with a person or company in the need of it. 
Generally the sharing economy is seen to create value in five ways. First it gives an 
opportunity to put underutilized assets into productive use. Second it connects multiple 
buyers and sellers making both sides of the market more competitive and enables 
greater specialization for the sellers. Third it decreases transaction costs in terms of 
finding buyers or sellers and performance monitoring. Fourth it minimizes the 
asymmetric information problem between buyers and sellers by offering public reviews. 
Lastly it creates value for customers who have become neglected by the incumbents due 
to the position in the regulatory framework. (Koopman, Mitchell &Thierer, 2015) 
2.1.1 Two-sided platforms 
As shown previously, today’s sharing economy requires intermediaries to facilitate the 
transactions between peers. These intermediaries are also known as two-sided 
marketplaces, platforms or networks. Companies such as Uber and Airbnb provide 
digital platforms that use computer algorithms to match service providers and buyers 
(Sühr, Biega, Zehlike, Gummadi & Chakraborty, 2019) and take a commission for the 
matchmaking (Uber, 2020b; Lyft, 2020b). These digital platforms are also known as 
two-sided marketplaces pairing two user groups by providing them both infrastructure 
and rules for transacting products and services (Eisenmann, Parker & Val Alstyne, 
2006) 
In their recent paper Sutherland & Jarrahi (2018) reviewed the research on sharing 
economy from the technology platform point of view. Their analysis revealed six 
affordances that are distinctive for sharing economy platforms. They 1) make it easier 
for the user to choose when and how to participate, 2) match users and providers based 
on their needs, 3) extend the reach of the participants by giving access to bigger or 
previously idle resources, 4) take care of the transactions so the users do not have to 
worry about them, 5) build trust among the users through e.g. reputation systems and 
policies and 6) facilitate collectivity by encouraging social activity. However the 
authors note that the extent of how each of these affordances display vary based on the 
platform and may even be accomplished through multiple interoperable platforms.  
The literature has also recognized the platforms inherent centralizing force gives them 
significant power over both the buyers and sellers (Ballon & Van Heesvelde, 2011; 
Sutherland & Jarrahi, 2018; Nowag, 2018). The level of centralization was also linked 
to the six affordances of sharing economy platforms by Sutherland & Jarrahi (2018). 
Because of the nature of platform business the companies tend to expand rapidly in the 
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hopes of gaining significant market leadership or even monopoly in order to reap the 
benefits of network effects (Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008; Eisenmann et al., 2006). Two-
sided platforms make no difference in this regard. 
Network effects or network externalities is an economic effect where a consumer 
buying a product or service directly benefits from the number of other consumers 
owning or using the same product or service (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 
1985). As an example the more users Facebook or Whatsapp has, the more beneficial it 
is for new users to register or the more drivers Uber has, the easier it is for a customer to 
find a ride when needed. The same effect also applies the other way around: the more 
users a network or marketplace has the more incentive an advertiser or a seller of a 
service or product has to join it.  
Compared to traditional industries like car manufacturing, the network effects have 
distinctive characteristic among Internet companies: customer loyalty (Porter, 2001). 
The author argued that due to the growing interoperability and lower switching costs, it 
is easier for customers to change the product or service that better meet their needs. 
However in order to bootstrap a new service, a two-sided platform has a chicken or the 
egg problem: in order to get sellers to the platform you need to have users and vice 
versa. This has led to revenue and market maximization instead of focusing on profits or 
a good business strategy in general. By religiously chasing new customers the 
companies use significant portions of their operating budget to advertising, partnerships 
and outsourcing without gaining significant competitive advantage. While Porter gave 
this warning already in the beginning of the millennia, the same strategies are still used 
in sharing economy companies like Uber and Airbnb 20 years later with no success in 
terms of profitability. Uber has not had a single profitable quarter since its inception 
(Goletz, 2019; Uber, 2020c) and Airbnb has not given public announcement on its 
financials so far other than revenue (Weinberg, 2019). 
Another distinctive problem for Internet era companies is multi-homing. It is a “choice 
of an agent in a user network to use more than one platform”. (Landsman & 
Stremersch, 2011, p. 39) and is opposite to the term single-homing which means using 
only single platform. Multi-homing has two dimensions: buyers and sellers. Buyer can 
source the product or service from multiple platforms and seller can list their product or 
service on multiple platforms at the same time. Users have been shown to prefer more 
than one platform simultaneously in order to gain more benefits (Hu, Zhao, Zou & 
Teng, 2017) since platforms tend to differ in features even though they would serve the 
same purpose. This shows that users on the buying side are willing to see a bit more 
trouble by installing multiple applications and switch between them in order to get their 
needs served fully. From the sellers point of view multi-homing offers possibility to sell 
to a larger audience in the hopes of bigger revenue but increases the cost of sales in 
platform fees and adaptation work (Landsman & Stremersch, 2011).  
Eisenmann et al. (2006) have written about platform strategies and identify three 
challenges typical for companies struggling with building successful two-sided market 
business. The first challenge is getting the pricing right since it does not follow the 
traditional cost of producing an extra unit but is actually much more complex task. 
Company has to choose if they should price both sides of the market equally or 
subsidize one side and charge the other side more. Author’s advice is to subsidize the 
side that is more sensitive for quality and price and then get the revenue from the side 
that has more to gain from the growth of the subsidized side. Additionally companies 
should secure big marquee users that have potential to attract more users. Secondly the 
two-sided marketplace provider should decide if there is a possibility that the market 
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would be served by one platform in the end and whether they would like to share it with 
competitors or fight for control. Third challenge is to avoid being swallowed by bigger 
platform that has overlapping user groups. This challenge can be dealt with by preparing 
to pivot the business model if needed. Later Bakos & Katsamakas (2008) complemented 
the strategy list by arguing that the fourth challenge is to design the network the right 
way. 
2.1.2 Ride-sourcing economy 
Ride-sourcing is part of the sharing economy where online intermediaries match 
passengers (buyers) with drivers with a car (sellers) and automate the customer process 
from payments to customer feedback (Schwieterman & Smith, 2018). Despite being 
very similar to taxi services, in ride-sourcing the customer cannot hail the taxi from 
street (Schwieterman & Smith, 2018).  
Multiple studies have identified different terms for hire a care with driver services such 
as ride-sharing, ride-sourcing, for-profit ride-sharing, or ride-hailing (Zha, Yin & Yang, 
2016). However in the recent literature the terms ride-sourcing and ride-hailing have 
become prevalent (Frenken & Schor, 2017). Especially the literature has started to 
question the sharing aspect in Uber-like services since a ride from place A to place B 
does not occur without the customer’s order where as in carpooling the ride happens 
regardless of the number of passengers (Frenken & Schor, 2017). In carpooling or ride-
splitting the parties are heading to same direction, at the same time and usually for the 
same reason (Ma & Hanrahan, 2020; Schwieterman & Smith, 2018). On the contrary in 
ride-sourcing the trip does not take place if both rider and passenger are not present. It 
also requires the rider to first drive to the location of the passenger and usually charge 
him or her for the ride afterwards (Ma & Hanrahan, 2020). For the sake of clarity, this 
study will use the term ride-sourcing from now on.  
Ride-sourcing started in 2009 when Uber was founded in the name of Ubercab and was 
followed by companies such as Lyft and DiDi Chuxing in 2012 and 2015 respectively. 
These companies provide rides-sourcing services and have been categorized as 
transportation network companies or TNCs (Flores & Rayle, 2017; Tzur, 2019). They 
offer consumer services ranging from door-to-door passenger transportation to ride-
splitting and have recently expanded to business services such as shipping and fast food 
delivery (Lyft, 2020a; Uber, 2020a). Compared to other transportation companies, 
TNCs do not own vehicles or employ drivers themselves but offer a platform where the 
people or companies owning one can sell their services to buyers.  
Technologically ride-sourcing type of services could not exist before four important 
innovations. First they required GPS to be introduced to smartphones that most of the 
population could afford. Second, a wireless Internet connection in the form of 3G and 
4G networks and their wide coverage around the world. Third, the transport network 
companies needed cloud services, popularized by companies like Amazon, Microsoft 
and Google, that offered an unprecedented way of scaling software services due to 
practically unlimited computing power and storage space available for low cost.   
Finally it can be argued that in order to reach a critical amount of users and to provision 
the software application effectively, digital application marketplaces or “appstores” 
were required (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2015). 
While ride-sourcing economy is a two-sided market where a platform connects both 
sellers and buyers, researchers have made arguments that the same business strategies 
may not suit it the same way as compared to say, video games or operating systems 
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(Guo,  Li & Zeng, 2019). The authors claim that the prominent strategy, subsidizing the 
side that is more price-sensitive and take payments from the other side that gains more 
from the growth of the subsidized side (Eisenmann et al., 2006), may not work in ride-
sourcing because both sides are essentially consumers. 
The same platform strategy described above can be seen in the actions of the ride-
sourcing companies. Because of the aggressive expansion strategies and winner-take-all 
competition (Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008; Eisenmann et al., 2006), the regulators are 
forced to keep close eye of the possible future scenarios in order to both maintain 
healthy competition and safety of the consumers.  
2.1.3 Regulation of taxi industry 
The regulation of ride-sourcing is multi-faceted by nature and is in its infancy. Until the 
inception of Uber, transporting people from door to door was a job for taxis that have 
been around more than 100 years. The roots of a taxi industry are in hackneys which 
were the means of personnel transportation already in 1600s in London and Paris 
(Williams, 1981). They were quickly regulated in order to limit the number of hackneys 
and preserve public safety.  The same reasons applied when government started to 
regulate taxis in 1920s in United States (Frankena & Pautler, 1984). Despite enabling 
people to hire a car with driver, ride-sourcing companies do not see themselves as taxi 
but as technology companies. This is the source of the even somewhat heated debate on 
the matter. In order to understand fully the regulative landscape ride-sourcing 
companies face today, it is important to understand the antecedents of the taxi industry 
regulation and deregulation. 
Since 1930s taxis have been regulated in United States with actions such as 1) limited 
entry by required registration or operation license, 2) setting a minimum level of 
insurance and vehicle safety rules, 3) controlling parking and passenger pick-up areas, 
4) regulating fares 5) controlling the color and signage of the vehicle, 6) requiring 
licensed taxi meter and 7) requiring certain level of driver expertise, courtesy and 
honesty (Dempsey, 1996). The same type of regulation is also present in Europe 
(Frazzani et al., 2016). In all cases the justification for the regulation has been to 
achieve better level of taxi service for the public by e.g. decreasing traffic congestion 
and air pollution, maximizing public safety and preventing discrimination (Dempsey, 
1996). 
This regulation, especially accompanied with the limited entry, creates a closed market 
with very little competition which in turn suggests that prices are not as efficient as they 
could be from the customer point of view. To address this market failure there has been 
deregulation actions in the past both in United States and in Europe.  
Dempsey (1996) synthesised the arguments for both taxi regulation and deregulation 
and the empirical results of deregulation attempts to the date. He  noted that the 
proponents of deregulation argue that the removal of the entry and pricing limitations 
which would lead to lower prices, better service and more options for the customers. 
However the empirical reality has not been as fruitful as the free market theory would 
suggest. Driving a taxi is a low-income job and removing the license requirement 
creates a very low barrier of entry. Accompanied with elimination of regional quotas 
this has two major implications. First the amount of drivers goes up especially during 
the recession while the number of potential customers goes down since people have less 
money to spend. Second, the high number of taxis create traffic congestions especially 
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around airports and hotels. This in turn lowers the accessibility for taxi ride outside city 
centers because it is much more profitable to drive in areas with dense population. 
Later Moore and Balaker (2006) drew together a number of economic studies of the 
benefits and disadvantages of deregulation. Based on the literature review the authors 
argue that both the customers and regulators suffer from information problems 
especially around airport and complete deregulation might not make sense. Another 
major issue is rent-seeking which is typical for taxi market: license owners are able to 
reap the profits and the drivers bear the financial risks and liabilities. Moore and 
Balaker conclude that deregulation can be beneficial if correct actions are taken and the 
focus of the efforts are put into decreasing rent-seeking and bureaucratic self-interest. 
2.1.4 Regulation of ride-sourcing 
The taxi market regulation and deregulation is significant background information when 
looking at legislation related to ride-sourcing from the regulator point of view. Ride-
sourcing is mapped together with taxis under segment called “hire cars with driver” 
(Frazzani et al., 2016). The ride-sourcing platforms are seen as online labour platforms 
and majority of the legislative pressure is around the existing taxi law, labour law and 
worker rights. A recent European Commission report by De Stefano & Aloisi (2018) 
acknowledges the different nature of online labour platforms. Their report finds that 
only a few European countries have created specific regulations for the online labour 
market players. They note that instead of creating regulation that would fit in every 
situation it would be more beneficial to investigate the fit of the existing labour law 
categories without disregarding the complicated nature of the sharing economy 
phenomenon. 
Platform and especially ride-sourcing economy introduces a number of problems in 
terms of current legislation (De Stefano & Aloisi, 2018; Thelen, 2018). How the 
company offering two-sided market platform and the worker using the platform should 
be classified? These regulative problems arise from the business model of the ride-
sourcing economy:   keep the organization as lean as possible by minimizing the amount 
of employees and relying on IT automation as much as possible (De Stefani & Aloisi, 
2018). This is their key competitive advantage and therefore a big driver for the 
platform companies to fight against any regulation that would hinder it. However on the 
other side of the discussion are the incumbent taxi companies whose primary 
competitive advantage have been the steep barriers of entry offered by the existing 
legislation (Thelen, 2018). 
Thelen (2018) identifies five regulative problems with Uber: 1) competition of the 
incumbent taxi firms, 2) employment and labor issues about how employment 
relationship is defined, 3) social policy especially in the case of healthcare which is 
usually available only for a person with employee status, 4) taxation policy of how the 
worker should pay taxes on the assignments made with own assets and 5) consumer 
safety where platforms claim they are safer than incumbent taxis because they provide 
better background checks.  
De Stefano & Aloisi (2018) find that the relation between platform and the worker can 
be assessed through five dimensions: 1) access to the platform and registration 2) 
selection process and hiring 3) performance execution and command power (4) rating 
and ranking, monitoring power (and deactivation) 5) payment rewards for completed 
tasks. 
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Sharing economy makes a fuzzy line between personal and professional status when 
offering commercial services. Still the offered services, mediated by platforms, are 
subject to traditional regulation. These regulations form barriers that restrict the growth 
of employment through peer-to-peer platforms. The platforms that are under close eye 
of the regulators should instead be taken as key actors in the regulatory framework. 
New digital era offers ways for self-regulation yet some governmental oversight is 
necessary since the interests of commercial companies and social welfare are probably 
not completely aligned. (Cohen & Sumdarajan, 2017)  
However it is hard to evaluate the current social and economic impacts of the sharing 
economy since most of the data is owned by the technology platform companies who do 
not want and are not required to share it transparently (Frenken & Schor, 2017). 
Accompanied with the privacy concerns (Teubner & Flath, 2019) it will be a 
challenging task for the regulators to build a coherent legislation without the full 
understanding about the consequences of the sharing phenomenon. 
2.2 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy has been studied in multiple fields such as management (Suchman, 1995; 
Suddaby, Bitektine & Haack, 2017), sociology (Johnson, Dowd & Ridgeway, 2006; 
Scott, 1995) and information systems (Kaganer, Pawlowski & Wiley-Patton, 2010; 
Wang & Swanson, 2007) and has provided various angles to understand the 
phenomenon. However through the years the discourse between researchers has been 
incoherent and the practitioners have recently sought to clarify the situation (Suddaby et 
al. 2017). The research has made a distinction between strategic and institutional 
approaches to legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In the first approach legitimacy is an 
operational resource that is extracted from cultural environment where the legitimation 
process requires major managerial control. The second approach sees legitimacy rather 
as a set of constitutive beliefs that are formed when organization is affected by external 
institutions. 
When defining legitimacy it is important to make distinction between what legitimacy is 
and what it is for (Suchman, 1995). Organizational legitimacy as seen by Suchman 
(1995, p. 574) is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, and definitions”. He argues that “legitimacy is possessed objectively, yet 
retained subjectively” which means that organization can largely diverge from societal 
norms but still preserve legitimacy because no one notices the difference between 
actions and norms. It might also be that while an individual does not see the 
organizations behaviour as legitimate, as a group the judgment can be the opposite.  
Regarding what the legitimacy is for, Suchman (1995) notes that being legitimate helps 
organizations to attract resources, to be easily understandable and to be seen as 
trustworthy. Organizations can also seek active or passive support to their legitimation. 
Generally legitimacy is pursued in order to attract new customers, employees, suppliers 
and partners or to gain legislative approval for their line of business. 
In institutional theory the legitimacy is made of and rests on three vital pillars (Scott, 
1995). The regulative pillar describes a system of rules that are supported by 
mechanisms of surveillance and sanctioning in order to guide people and organizations 
in their actions. Normative pillar guides actions through values and norms which are 
seen as preferred or desirable in the given external environment. Normative system 
designates objectives that should be pursued and defines suitable means to achieve 
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those. It differs from regulative system because it gives weight to the role a person or 
organization has in the system and describes how the actor should behave. Not all 
values and norms apply to all actors. The final pillar is called cultural-cognitive which 
emphasizes the significance of the social interactions and beliefs that create boundaries 
for the actions of actors. Cultural-cognitive view also stresses the weight of subjective 
interpretation in addition to the objective conditions.  
2.2.1 Different types of legitimacy 
Multiple studies have offered lenses to evaluate and categorize organizational 
legitimacy (Kaganer et al., 2010; Suchman, 1995; Suddaby et al., 2017). From the 
previous literature Suchman (1995) identified three different forms of organizational 
legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive.  
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on self-interest where support is given to an organization 
in the hopes of gaining something in return such as support for your own cause or 
favourable development of one’s larger interests. Moral legitimacy on the other hand 
judges whether activity is perceived as the “right thing to do” depending on the 
audiences values. The evaluated values can be outputs of the organization, techniques 
and procedures they use, the structure how they are organized or what kind of 
impression their leaders and representatives give. The third form, cognitive legitimacy, 
is based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. Comprehensibility is about 
how predictable, meaningful or inviting the actions are while taken-for-grantedness is 
seen as the ultimate level of legitimacy where the observers do not even consider other 
options. (Suchman, 1995) 
Kaganer et al. (2010) investigated the above three forms of organizational legitimacy 
through the legitimation mechanism (desirability and validity) in the diffusion of IT 
innovation. Their research also found a socio-political legitimacy which is actually a 
meta-type because it can be gained through any of the pragmatic, moral or regulative 
forms. Socio-political legitimacy is more a process through which the key actors 
recognize the endeavour as appropriate considering the prevailing norms and laws 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
Literature has also proposed control legitimacy as a new type of legitimacy (Bijlsma-
Frankema & Costa, 2010). It focuses on a set of controls used by managers to control 
employee performance and behaviour. Control legitimacy has four sources: justice, 
autonomy, competence development, group identification. Balancing the level of 
control on the above sources is crucial in order to create positive evaluations from the 
employees. Being too strict may evoke negative attitude and undermine the efforts to 
gain legitimacy. Recently Cram and Wiener (2018) studied the relationship between 
perceived control legitimacy and information systems development control activities. 
They found out that managers can improve the organizational performance by focusing 
on employees hopes for the four sources of control legitimacy but keeping the control in 
balance in order to avoid the negative outcomes. 
To address the complicated field of legitimacy literature, Suddaby, Bitektine & Haack 
(2017) investigated how the scholars have examined the concept of legitimacy. Their 
analysis revealed three distinct perspectives of how legitimacy is viewed by researchers: 
property, process and perception. They recognized three key roles that appear in each 
perspective: 1) an object, the one being evaluated by others, 2) a change agent who 
wants to change the state of the legitimacy and finally 3) the evaluator who provides the 
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legitimacy judgment. The emphasis is different on each role depending on the used 
perspective as we will see later. 
Legitimacy-as-property views legitimacy as a result of structures and routines within an 
organization and the assumptions of the external environment. An example of this kind 
of legitimacy would be an organization that acquires a publicly recognized certification. 
Legitimacy is seen as a resource, an asset or a capacity occurring between the object and 
its environment by having certain attributes meeting the external expectations.  
Instead of focusing on properties the legitimacy-as-process considers the journey of 
how legitimacy is constructed by different agents and social actors. Example of 
legitimacy-as-process view would be examining the rhetoric an organization uses to 
legitimise the existence of their new product. Here the legitimacy is ever evolving state 
between multiple actors who want or do not want a change to happen.  
The third perspective, legitimacy-as-perception, explores the role of individuals in the 
legitimacy process and how their judgment is constructed i.e. what different elements 
affect to stakeholder’s opinion. Here legitimacy is a social judgment or an evaluation 
occurring between individual and evaluators. 
2.2.2 Regulative legitimacy 
This study takes a closer look at the regulative legitimacy. Scott (1995, p. 42) defines it 
as the amount organization complies with “explicit regulative processes - rule setting, 
monitoring and sanctioning activities”. Kaganer et al. (2010) go as far as arguing 
regulative legitimacy is the fourth type of legitimacy in addition to pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive forms instead of just being a part of the first one. The same authors highlight 
its importance in IT domain and especially when launching new information 
technologies. From the previous literature they identify that IT innovation needs to 
conform to policies and directives set by formal authority and achieve compliance with 
IT regulations. Finally regulative legitimacy is needed to ease the diffusion when 
adopter organization takes the IT innovation into use. 
Regulative and legislative landscape has significant effect on where and how 
organizations can do business for example in the form of entry and bankruptcy costs, 
credit and tax rules, property rights, employment laws (Klapper, Laeven & Rajan, 
2006). Even more so, laws and regulations have the ability to boost or obstruct 
behaviour depending on the goals of the regulator (Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
Deephouse & Suchman (2008) argue that the absence of regulative legitimacy problems 
indicates the organization is accepted by the authorities. They also note that having 
these issues is not straightforward indicator of a real challenge but may be just a show 
made for the general public. Without respecting the prevailing legislation a company 
cannot operate sustainably. The fact that regulations and laws are created and 
administrated by institutions brings in politics and corruption. Previous literature has 
showed that regulation in less democratic countries is heavier, entry to a market is 
harder and the price of entry is higher but it does not yield to better quality of goods and 
services (Djankov, La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002). On the contrary if the political 
climate is stable the legitimacy gained through regulation or a law probably will not 
diminish quickly.   
This is why regulations and regulative climate is considered a major business risk 
(Klapper, Laeven, Rajan, 2006) and is a key concern when organization weighs entering 
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a new market or location (Djankov et al., 2002). Organizations choose to either comply 
with current legislation or seek to change it to support their business (Chalmers & 
Matthews, 2019; Pelzer, Frenken & Boon, 2019; Serafin, 2019). Even when the 
legislation is changed to support new technologies it does not guarantee regulative 
legitimacy for technology or business. An example of this is the recent work by 
Väyrynen and Lanamäki (2020) who studied how the policy ambiguity and legal 
indeterminacy affects the regulative legitimacy of technology. They argue that when the 
legislation changes from clear and specific to ambiguous the legitimacy perspective 
changes from a property to a process. 
The next chapter will elaborate on the different legitimacy strategies that organizations 
have used in order to build legitimacy. 
2.2.3 Legitimacy strategies 
How legitimacy can be gained? A number of studies have addressed the issue from new 
organization or venture point of view (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Kaganer et al., 2010; 
Suchman, 1995). The following strategies provide an understanding about how the 
required actions differ depending on what level of legitimacy is sought by the 
organization. Suchman (1995) recognized two challenges in legitimacy building: 1) 
sector building which refers to differentiating the new industry from the incumbents and 
2) creating new constituencies and convincing existing entities to help with the new 
endeavour. 
Aldrich & Fiol (1994) focused on entrepreneurial strategies for new industries which 
were categorized based on the legitimacy type and level of analysis. Authors recognized 
two types of legitimacy: cognitive and socio-political and the strategies were discussed 
on four levels. On organizational level the cognitive strategy is to use symbolic 
language and behaviors to develop audience’s knowledge. Socio-political strategy is to 
develop trust towards the new activity by using consistence storytelling internally since 
there are no external sources of validation. After reaching some trust to their 
organization, founders should focus on interactions with other organizations in the same 
industry. Aldrich & Fiol call this intra-industry level. The cognitive strategy is to 
encourage similarities with the dominant design to earn validation again in the absence 
of external evidence. Socio-political strategy suggests that instead of fighting over 
designs or standards, it would be more fruitful to build perspective of reliability through 
collective actions with partner or even competitive organizations. 
Inter-industry level strategies consist of interactions with organisations on other 
industries. According to the study it is important to garner reputation on other industries 
as well since they may otherwise hinder the business opportunities or even pose a threat 
for existence. To gain cognitive legitimacy founders have to use third-party actors such 
as trade associations to promote their public image. Gaining socio-political legitimacy is 
also vital in order to block the possible resistance from the incumbents of other 
industries. This can be achieved via negotiations and compromises with other industries. 
All the previous three strategy levels aim to lay the basis for the final, institutional level 
strategies. These strategies aim to build cognitive legitimacy by encouraging 
educational organizations such as universities or technology schools to provide teaching 
in the area of the new industry. Socio-political approval or at least tolerance should be 
sought after by organizing collective marketing and lobbying ventures or otherwise it 
might become a critical obstacle for the company’s future.  
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Suchman (1995) argued that legitimacy building efforts can be divided into three 
clusters: 1) those that adapt to the orders of incumbents, 2) those that select the 
environment in order to find favourable audience and 3) those that manipulate the 
environment in the hopes of building new audience and sympathetic beliefs. Each of 
these have different flavours depending what type of legitimacy is sought: pragmatic, 
moral or cognitive. 
The first cluster, adapting to the rules established by existing players, is the easiest route 
in the sense it does not require building new cognitive frames. However it does require 
the organization to meet the needs of multiple audiences, producing meritorious results 
or seek mimetic isomorphism by carefully copying the most reputational entities but 
trying to keep their unique advantages at the same time. Selecting applicable 
environment involve marketing research for recognizing the ideal audiences, recruiting 
people with credibility on the particular avenue or altering organization’s moral criteria 
to fit to the prevailing culture. When the previous two clusters of strategies are not 
sufficient, organization can manipulate the environment in order to gain legitimacy. 
This is true for example in cases where an innovation contradicts the existing norms so 
much that the cultural environment must be prepared in advance for the new product. 
This can be achieved through advertising, accumulating a track record of success, 
lobbying, popularization or standardization. While studying IT diffusion Kaganer et al. 
(2010) identified an additional regulative legitimacy cluster which consists of strategies 
such as signalling how the new practice complies with applicable laws and regulations.  
On information technology side Kaganer et al. (2010) results contributed to how firms 
can gain legitimacy by studying medical technology adoption and the strategies used to 
promote it to users and other key stakeholders. The authors developed IT legitimation 
taxonomy that consists of 26 discursive strategies that are divided into eight strategy 
groups.  
First group is system which consists of strategies defining features, attributes and 
characteristics of the IT system and how they are aligned with the current best practices. 
Second identified group is implementation which focuses on delivery strategies, success 
stories and proactive risk management regarding the system. Third group of strategies is 
organizational and end-user diffusion which aim to gain wider adoption and utilization 
rate. Biggest group pinpointed by Kaganer et al. (2010) was value. Considerable amount 
of discourse was focused around explaining how the innovation decreases costs, 
improves quality and operational performance in the adopter organization. Alliance 
group contains strategies around collaborative actions towards collective advertisement, 
forging partnerships and convincing influential actors on the field. Sixth group 
concentrates on reputational factors around the organization’s founders, awards won 
and size of the market share. The last two identified groups include normative and 
regulative strategies. Normative actions should emphasize harmony with prevailing 
moral standards and enabling role of the innovation. Regulative legitimacy strategies 
involve complying with rules set by key regulative agencies. 
Dorobantu, Kaul and Zelner (2017) synthesized the earlier literature on nonmarket 
strategy research and institutional economics. They argue that companies generally have 
three options when contesting for competitive advantage. Companies can choose either 
to adapt to the current institutional environment, try to improve it or try to transform it 
completely to suit their needs. While focusing on the choice of the strategy, Dorobantu 
et al. (2017) also made a division between incomplete and captured institutions. 
Incomplete institutions do not have rules or governance structure in place or lacking 
sufficient monitoring. Captured institutions have rules and structures but they are 
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enforced to meet the interests of a small inside group. Despite incomplete institutions 
may have immature governance, they affect all market actors the same way. In captured 
institutions the outsiders are affected by the rules and insiders enjoy privileges that give 
them competitive edge over others in the market.  
2.2.4 Legitimacy in the context of ride-sourcing 
The organizational and legitimation aspect of sharing and platform economies and how 
they blend in to culture had received little attention until recently (Mair & Reischauer, 
2017). In their research Mair & Reischauer argue that sharing economy organizations 
face a lot of institutional level complexity because their competitors are both the other 
sharing economy companies and the traditional companies who do not wish them to 
enter the same market. They called for research on the consequences of the legitimation 
strategies used by sharing economy companies in order to understand why they engaged 
such ventures in the first place. 
On ride-sourcing a few studies have emerged on legitimation challenges focused on 
United States (Chalmers & Matthews, 2019; Garud, Kumaraswamy & Roberts, 2020; 
Seidl, 2020) and Asia (Fan, Xia, Zhang & Chen, 2019;Tseng & Chan, 2019; Zhang, 
Kien & Lee, 2018) and in Europe so far (Pelzer et al., 2019; Serafin, 2019; Uzunca, 
Rigtering & Ozcan, 2018). The work by Garud et al. (2020) argue that sharing economy 
companies, in order to gain visibility, have to enter new areas despite of the risk of 
running into regulative and legislative issues. 
The work by Uzunca et al. (2018) revealed that similar strategies have different effects 
depending on the country they were applied to. Countries where the degree of 
institutionalization was low, Uber and Airbnb had more opportunities to transform the 
institutional environment confirming what Dorobantu et al. (2017) found earlier in their 
work. On the contrary, the countries that institutionalization was more developed the 
same strategies did not have as good results. They also found that the national 
governments attitude towards transformation had high impact on the legitimacy building 
efforts. 
Fan et al. (2019) studied how ride-sourcing company Uber’s socially embedded process 
affected the generation of organizational legitimacy and its sustainability in China. They 
identified the importance of addressing the cultural differences between the institutional 
environments between the host and targeted expansion countries. The success of social 
embeddedness in general depends greatly on focusing on structural, cognitive, cultural 
and historical embeddedness. This means minimizing cultural gaps and emphasizing the 
user experience in the beginning of the venture and then gradually developing 
relationships with local partners and institutions. Failing in social embeddedness gives 
the edge to the local competitors and decreasing the chances of generation 
organizational legitimacy. 
Uber’s expansion efforts were also studied in Taiwan by Tseng and Chan (2019). They 
research revealed how Uber used the strategies of framing, aggregating and bridging 
when building justification and legitimation for their venture. In order to get rid of 
illegal image, Uber framed their services as improving society, improving the usage of 
idle resources and providing more choices of transportation for people who do not own 
a car. By holding charity events, launching services for disabled persons and working 
together with animal shelters, Uber polished their brand image and steered the attention 
away from its grey business. Aggregating users and especially drivers was Uber’s way 
to gain ground in Taiwan. The company encouraged to give feedback and referrals in 
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return of discount codes and other prizes. While still walking a narrow line legally, Uber 
paid the fines of its drivers and reach to hundreds of thousands of people to get 
signature for online petition. The third strategy, bridging, aims to build legitimacy 
through partnering with car dealer and rental services, offering promotions to shops and 
releasing an open web based API for third-party vendors to develop cooperative service 
with other industries. Uber also shared the usage data with the government in order to 
show how its technology empowers the society. 
2.3 Summary 
This literature review has revealed several key concepts that narrow the scope of the 
empirical study: 
Sharing economy is “an IT-facilitated peer-to-peer model for commercial or non-
commercial sharing of under-utilized goods or service capacity through an 
intermediary without transfer of ownership” (Schlagwein et al., 2019, p. 13) and it 
creates value by 1) effective use of underutilized assets, 2) brings together multiple 
buyers and sellers, 3) minimizes transaction costs, 4) decreases asymmetric information 
problem and 5) creates value for customer segments who are underserved by 
incumbents (Koopman, Mitchell &Thierer, 2015). Ride-sourcing companies are match-
making platforms that are both manifestations of sharing economy and two-sided 
marketplaces. They are intermediaries who match passengers (customers) and drivers 
with a car (service providers) and automate everything else of the customer experience 
except the ride itself via online platform. The key competitive advantage of these 
transport network companies (TNCs) versus the traditional taxi companies is to not 
employ drivers or own vehicles themselves. 
Ride-sourcing platforms have both old and new challenges in conducting their business. 
In the beginning two-sided marketplace has to attract both buyers and sellers to get the 
ball rolling. Network effects are probably the most important aspect for any business 
today and transport network companies make no exception. Low switching costs and 
multi-homing for both passengers and drivers has led to a crusade for network effects 
where aggressive expansion strategies are employed and TNCs use major portions of 
their budgets to advertising and lobbying.  
Ride-sourcing companies are offering technology that disrupts the way more than 
century old profession of driving people from place A to B is done. But before these 
Uber-like technologies came to exist the taxi industry had already created a closed 
ecosystem with the help of legislators. The legislative challenges for the newcomers is 
not restricted only to taxi licences, pricing or required vehicle equipment but also the 
employer and employee relationship. Drivers are private contractors, partners, who do 
not enjoy the traditional healthcare available for employee or any other employee 
protection mechanisms that legislation offers but the platforms still exercise similar 
control to them as they would do to employees.  
Organizational legitimacy has been defined as “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). It was 
divided into three categories: pragmatic, moral and cognitive.  However in recent years 
and especially in information technology the research has argued that fourth category, 
regulative legitimacy exists where the organization complies with “explicit regulative 
processes - rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities. In most countries taxi 
market is regulated in such a way that ride-sourcing companies or at least their sellers, 
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the drivers, are illegal. As long as driving for a ride-sourcing platform is not legitimized 
the companies cannot do business, at least not sustainably.  
The previous literature shows that this legitimacy problem is clearly identified among 
the players such as Uber. While their business model is not legitimate from the 
beginning, they use different strategies to manipulate the environment they operate in to 
transform the regulative state from illegal to legal. TNCs try to gain regulative 
legitimacy by changing the existing regulation to support their business models but they 
already start to operate before the legislation is ready. While operating under grey area 
the TNCs actively persuade their audiences with different marketing strategies in order 
to gain social embeddedness together with moral and cognitive legitimacy so that the 
law makers would be forced to bend to their will. 
Given the above background it is fruitful to investigate how ride-sourcing companies in 
fact achieve regulative legitimacy and how they have tried to gain legitimacy 
themselves in a Nordic country such as Finland. The IT legitimacy by Kaganer et al. 
(2010) identified eight categories of legitimation strategies used to justify the need for a 
new clinical information system. The identified categories were related to system, 
implementation, diffusion, value and alliance in addition to reputation, normative and 
regulative aspects. This taxonomy is used later in the analysis of the case material as a 
lens to make sense to Uber’s legitimation efforts in Finland. 
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3. Research design 
This chapter defines research method used in the study and how the research material is 
collected and analysed. I will conduct an interpretive qualitative research as the method 
to investigate the regulation of digital platforms in the context of ride-sourcing. The 
study focuses on a single case country, Finland, and collects secondary data from law 
texts, EU directives, regulations and reports which are then content analysed to form a 
coherent picture of the state of the regulation. I will first explore the case study as a 
research method then describe the collection of material and finally elaborate on the 
how the material was analysed. 
3.1 Research method 
In this is thesis I use interpretive qualitative research method to learn how ride-sourcing 
platforms companies have been regulated in Finland and how the companies have 
sought legitimation for their business model during the reform and subsequent 
amendments to transportation law in 2015-2020. 
In contrast to positivist research where scientific knowledge only includes distinct facts 
and values, an interpretive research is based on the assumption that it is not possible to 
objectively study events or situations but rather seek relativistic and share understanding 
of phenomena (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Orlikowski and Baroudi argue that the 
goal of  the research is to “understand how members of a social group, through their 
participation in social processes, enact their particular realities and endow them with 
meaning, and to show how these meanings, beliefs and intensions of the members help 
to constitute their social action.” (p. 13).  
Qualitative research collects data which includes words and pictures instead of numbers 
(Gilgun, 1992) and it makes the researcher to “delve into the complexity of the problem 
rather than abstract it away. Thus, the results are richer and more informative” 
(Seaman, 1999, p. 557). 
Walsham (1995) emphasizes a thorough description of the case in order to educate both 
the researchers and the reader about the background of the examined phenomenon and 
the intertwined conceptual structures which impact heavily on the interpretation of the 
studied subject and the different interpretation of the stakeholders about the subject. In 
order to avoid only seeing what initial theory suggests, Walsham advices to remain open 
and be willing to modify the initial assumptions and theory when the research 
progresses. This enables iterative process which may even end up giving up the initial 
theories. In this research the initial literature review provided the essential background 
against which the data interpretation could be done efficiently by identifying important 
concepts and structures. 
Many studies concerning doing interpretive case studies stress the challenges 
conducting empirical work (Yin, 1994; Walsham, 1995; Klein & Myers, 1999; 
Walsham, 2006). The role of the researcher can be outside observer or involved 
researcher (Walsham, 1995) where one must be careful not to affect the contents of the 
collected data. Since this study was conducted as a desk research, the role is outside 
observer and avoids the caveat of affecting the data with his or her own opinions. 
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However this also poses a limitation to the study as the lack of access to insights of 
persons who worked with the legislation process directly. Walsham (1995) argues that 
generally interviews are the primary data source for interpretive studies.  
Based on previous literature Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987, p. 370) define case 
study as research that “examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing 
multiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities 
(people, groups, or organizations)”. Later Yin (1994, p. 13) emphasized the evasive 
nature of the research subject by noting that “case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  
Case study method has been described as “bridge across paradigms” that fits nicely for 
studying complex phenomena (Luck, Jackson & Usher, 2006). Benbasat et al. (1987) 
argue that the method suits well to information systems research because it allows the 
researcher to study the phenomena in their natural environment and answer “how” and 
“why” questions. Lastly case study fits well into areas where the number of previous 
studies is low. The authors emphasize that in information systems new topics are 
unravelled constantly due to the rapid development of technology. 
Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 372) use four questions to evaluate whether case study is 
appropriate approach to investigate the given phenomenon: 
1) Can the phenomenon of interest be studied outside its natural setting? 
2) Must the study focus on contemporary events? 
3) Is control or manipulation of subjects or events necessary? 
4) Does the phenomenon of interest enjoy an established theoretical base? 
The topic of this study cannot be studied outside its natural setting because of the nature 
of legislations and clearly requires the focusing on contemporary events as I am trying 
to establish a view how ride-sourcing platforms are regulated today and how they try to 
transform the regulations to their favour. I also do not need to manipulate subjects or 
events since the information is already available in public records. The current 
theoretical base has focused mainly to the strategies the ride-sourcing platforms have 
used to gain legitimacy but very little on the constraints they are facing from regulative 
institutions. 
Regarding the trustworthiness of the results Yin (1994) emphasizes that the case study 
should provide clear traces of any evidence starting from the research questions to the 
conclusions. This study heeds the advice by carefully creating unique identifiers for 
each entry in case material and finding. 
3.2 Data collection 
Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 374) note that the goal of data collection “is to obtain a rich set 
of data surrounding the specific research issue, as well as capturing the contextual 
complexity”. They also stress that for the sake of reliability and validity the research 
should describe its data sources and the way they contribute to the findings. Walsham 
(1995) states that reporting about the data collection should include details about the 
interviewed persons, other data sources and the period of time when the data was 
acquired. 
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In this study I did not conduct interviews but obtained secondary material made publicly 
available from government website material, including national level legislations, 
regulations, EU directives and reports of the given area between 2007 and 2020. Also 
selected newspaper articles about judicial verdicts and general public opinion were used 
when they provided relevant background information to the case. Comments to law 
proposals by ride-sourcing organizations were collected from the government public 
archive in order to find evidence on how they have tried to transform the legislation to 
favour their business model and to gain regulative legitimacy. Each material entry was 
recorded to a separate spreadsheet and was given an identification tag “FI” plus an 
increasing number starting from 1. Additionally each document entry was described 
further by topic, type of the document, country it was targeting or originating from, date 
when the document was published, date when it was accessed and a link to the 
document. The contents of the collected material are discussed in the chapter 4 and 
findings in chapter 5. The full material list can be found in Appendix 1.  
3.3 Data analysis 
Reporting of data analysis should at least include how the data was recorded, analyzed 
and how the iterative process of going through theory and empirical data was conducted 
and how it evolved during the research (Walsham, 1995). 
The data was analysed by going through the government’s law proposals, expert and 
Uber’s official and public arguments to those proposals and the final law texts where the 
law had been approved. The aim was to identify 1) the exact law sections that have an 
effect on ride-sourcing companies’ business model and operations, 2) how and which 
items the ride-sourcing companies tried to transform with their official comments and  
finally 3) what type of strategies were used as proposed by Kaganer et al. (2010). 
All data was put into spreadsheet format. Each argument was given an ID and then 
sought from both the final government proposal and law text first by searching an 
identifying term in the argument and finally by manual reading for proofing purposes. 
The location of Uber’s argument and possible equivalent proposal / law text was 
recorded with page number and if given, chapter / section number. The result of each 
identified argument was evaluated whether it could be found on the final law proposal 
based on the criteria in table 1. This part of the analysis did not consider whether the 
law was ultimately approved, approved with modification or abandoned. 
The analysis did not go through the initial proposals that Uber commented on 2016 and 
2018 but did include the assessment memo from 2020. Since the latest law process in 
2020 had two different documents, assessment memo and final proposal, that Uber 
commented, they were separated in analysis with labels “2020a” and “2020b” 
respectively.  
Table 1 shows how each argument was evaluated based on where and in what form it 
was found in proposals or law texts. 
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Table 1: Descriptions of the law proposal argument evaluation  
Classification Found in 
proposal or law 
Description 
Proposal Yes found in final proposal arguments 
Law Yes found in law text 
Partially in proposal  Yes, partially the original idea of the argument was found 
in proposal but was not fully executed 
Partially in law Yes, partially the original idea of the argument was found 
in law but was not fully executed 
Removed No The item in preliminary proposal was 
removed in the final proposal 
Not found No the argument was not used in proposal 
justifications and was not in the law text 
 
Finally each argument was evaluated against the strategies from IT legitimacy 
taxonomy by Kaganer et al. (2010). References to other countries laws or court 
decisions were considered as regulative - compliance strategy even though it can be 
argued that they do not fill the description of the original strategy category exactly. 
Furthermore the arguments that commented current regulation or how it should evolve 
were also categorized as regulative –compliance. Table 2 lists the strategies in IT 
legitimation taxonomy and the ones found in the empirical data of this study are bolded.  
Table 2. IT legitimation strategies adopted from Kaganer et al. (2010) 
Strategy name Strategy description 
System - functionality Explicitly define key features, attributes and usage 
conditions of the innovation 
System - configuration Explicitly define key characteristics of the underlying IT 
artifact 
System - characteristics Describe the characteristics of the innovation that are in 
alignment with the current technological best practices 
Implementation - strategies Describe implementation strategies/success factors 
Implementation - successes Demonstrate implementation successes (examples) 
Implementation - challenges Discuss challenges/risks associated with the innovation 
Diffusion - organizational Describe positive market response to the innovation; 
emphasize ongoing development of the innovation 
Diffusion - end user Stress acceptance of the innovation by end users 
Value - clinical - rationale Explain how the innovation improves quality of medical care in 
an adopter organization 
Value - clinical - success story Provide examples of how the innovation improves quality of 
medical care in adopter organization 
Value - financial - rationale Explain how the innovation improves financial performance 
of an adopter organization 
Value - financial - success 
story 
Provide examples of how the innovation improves financial 
performance of an adopter organization 
Value - operational - 
rationale 
Explain how the innovation improves operational 
performance of an adopter organization 
Value - operational - success 
story 
Provide examples of how the innovation improves operational 
performance of an adopter organization 
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Value - business - rationale Explain how the innovation improves general business 
performance of an adopter organization 
Value - business - success 
story 
Provide examples of how the innovation general business 
performance of an adopter organization 
Value - IT - rationale Explain how the innovation improves management of IT in an 
adopter organization 
Value - IT success story Provide examples of how the innovation improves management 
of IT in an adopter organization 
Alliance - adopter Advertise collaborative long-term relationships with adopters 
Alliance - vendor Advertise partnerships/collaborations with other innovation 
entrepreneurs 
Alliance - field-level actor Advertise affiliation with influential field level actors 
Reputation - vendor Emphasize the innovation entrepreneurs' strong reputation in 
the innovation domain and related areas 
Reputation - adopter Describe (favorable) characteristics / stress reputation of the 
adopter organization 
Normative - moral Stress congruence of the innovation with prevailing moral 
norms; provide examples 
Normative - transformation Emphasize the ongoing transformation of the adopters' 
industry; stress the enabling role of the innovation 
Regulative - compliance Stress compliance with legal and quasi-legal rules and 
regulations 
 
A pivot table was created from the evaluated material and the results were examined 
through the lens of IT legitimacy taxonomy proposed by Kaganer et al. (2010) in order 
to see what type of legitimation strategies were used each year and if the results differed 
from each other. The results are discussed thoroughly in chapter 5. 
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4. Case of deregulating the taxi market in Finland 
For this thesis I chose to study the evolution of Finnish taxi legislations from the ride-
sourcing company point of view. Finland is an interesting case because it recently chose 
to remove all barriers of entry from the taxi market in order to enable new business 
models (F01) only to tighten the grip again after to mediocre results (FI04) and public 
pressure. The case material provides evidence on how ride-sourcing platforms have 
been and are regulated today in Finland. Additionally the material provides insight how 
the platform companies have tried to legitimize their business during the uncertain 
regulative atmosphere. Figure 1 illustrates what time period of time the subchapters 
cover and how they relate on the effective changes regarding ride-sourcing platforms. 
 
Figure 1. Timeline showing the periods of case study chapters and discussed key events 
 
4.1 History of Finnish taxi regulation 
Prior the year 2018 the personnel transportation in Finland was regulated in the similar 
manner than in most developed countries (F20). The justifications for strict regulation 
were generally consumer safety and service quality in order to minimize black market 
fees and guarantee ride availability also in remote areas. 
First in order to acquire a taxi licence the applicant had to be of legal age, have good 
reputation and be able to manage financial obligations. Additionally he or she would 
have to have 6 months experience as a taxi driver and have successfully completed an 
entrepreneur course minimum of 120 hours. Once the license was issued the holder had 
obligation to offer taxi services around the year in designated area and report changes in 
on call duty hours to authorities.  
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Entrepreneurs did not have leeway on how to conduct their business and by what 
means. The pricing model was defined in the law and the commission from the ride 
consisted of basic, mileage and waiting fees and the maximum price was determined by 
industry cost index. Strict quality standards were set for the service such as vehicle 
features, condition and equipment, agreed all agreed on call shifts are driven, driver 
dress code, payment options and driving route decisions. Moreover the vehicle used to 
transport passengers had to have a physical meter for measuring distance and price 
(FI23). 
All regions had limited number of taxi licenses as well. Public authority determined the 
number of licenses based on variety of attributes such as the population development 
and their income level, length of the road infrastructure, number of accommodation and 
public transportation. If there were more applicants than available licenses, the license 
would generally be given to an applicant who was the most experienced in driving a taxi 
(FI21). 
The law was unambiguous on hire a car with driver services. Either you ticked all the 
regulative boxes for the taxi entrepreneur or you were not allowed to transport 
personnel by car. Despite the negative regulative state of ride-sourcing, Uber registered 
a subsidiary to Finland in September 2014 and started its operations in November 2014 
prior the changes in taxi legislation (FI15). Another ride-sourcing company Taxify was 
also registered on 2014. Both companies were active until late 2016 when driving for 
Uber was ruled illegal by Finnish Court of Appeal (FI18). 
4.2 Reform of law on transportation services 
It was not until November 2015 when Cabinet of Juha Sipilä decided that personal 
transportation services were one of the primary areas to remove regulation deemed 
unnecessary and enhance the development of digital services such as ride-sourcing in 
Finland (F01). The arguments for deregulation were to create fertile ground for new 
technology and business models such as mobility as a service (MaaS) and speed up the 
overall digitalization in the area of transportation. The program also pursued creating 
application interfaces (API) to give access to “necessary information about mobility 
services” and create interoperability between ticket and payment systems. The 
deregulation aimed to level the playground for all players, create jobs and decrease the 
public administrative workload and costs by enabling free market.  
4.2.1 Regulative legitimacy 
The concrete deregulation steps for taxi market from the ride-sourcing point of view in 
the final law on transportation services 320/2017 (FI03) were: 
1) Remove regional boundaries set for personal transportation 
2) Remove taxi license quota 
3) Remove 120 hour entrepreneurship course and taxi driver exam 
4) Renew taxi license to be tied to driver instead of vehicle 
5) Remove requirement of 6 month experience as a taxi driver 
6) Remove maximum price ceiling 
7) Remove rules for specific pricing model 
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Additionally an amendment (FI24) was made to law on vehicles 1090/2002 (FI23): 
8) Allow also other technologies to be used in measuring ride length & duration in 
addition to traditional taximeter 
The law still required the driver to have “a good reputation” meaning no arduous 
criminal convictions, have adequate communication skills and the company or sole 
trader is to have solid financial background. From enforcing point view the dispatching 
company was required to give the information about the total revenue invoiced from 
dispatched rides. Even though the price ceiling and specific pricing model rules were 
removed, the dispatch operator or driver had to clearly state the total price or guidance 
about how the price of the ride will be calculated.  
The new act had requirements for information systems and information sharing which 
included dispatching services specifically. It enforced the companies to build or be 
compatible with open application interfaces and any discrimination was disallowed. The 
primary reason was to enable Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency to acquire 
information about used routes, stops and schedules but also give opportunity for other 
organizations.  In addition to interoperable information sharing, the Act enforced 
players to build compatible ticket and payment systems to enable third-party systems to 
buy at least basic tickets through them. This API requirement supported the acts 
digitalization and levelled playground efforts. (FI03) 
The law was accepted on 24.5.2017 and became effective on 1.8.2018. It granted ride-
sourcing companies regulative legitimacy to enter the personnel transportation market 
and price their service according to their new business model. 
4.2.2 Legitimation efforts by Uber 
Uber and Taxify, both ride-sourcing companies, commented the Act during the given 
timeframe. Uber applauded the deregulation efforts and highlighted the following 
benefits for customers and society in general (FI15): 
1) Ease of use 
2) Decreases the need to own a car and reduces CO2 emissions 
3) Helps the public transportation efficiency by begin the option for the route’s 
last-mile from public transportation stop to final destination 
4) Increase the utilization rate of taxi services. Less idle time because it is easier to 
find customers thanks to navigation, GPS and mobile technologies 
5) Better utilization of private cars (idle resources), less parking space needed and 
more apartments, parks or stores 
6) Attracting new customers, co-existing with traditional taxi services 
Uber also emphasized how opening the taxi market would lead to better services and 
quality for the consumers. They also argued that keeping the taxi license quota would 
prevent decreasing traffic congestion and private car ownership. Dynamic pricing would 
ensure the passengers would always get a ride when they want because higher prices 
will focus more drivers to dense areas. Measuring the price of the ride also with other 
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means than sealed physical device would enable technological innovation and 
customers would be able to see the pricing mechanism before they make the order. 
Uber used a consult report which estimated ride-sharing would bring 100 million euros 
income to Stockholm alone and create new jobs. The ride-sourcing company added that 
its technology enables data driven safety measures before, during and after the trip. 
Safety measure should extend beyond mere background check: gathering information 
during and after the ride. Legislation should also establish transparency by giving the 
passenger right to see the name of the driver, picture and registration plate before 
stepping into the car. Uber wanted to make sure the obligation of the Acts second phase, 
eligibility for giving a ride, is enforced in the future. 
Concerns were risen about the 10000€ income limit. Giving a ride should not require 
taxi license at all or any income limit. Moreover the suggested limit would artificially 
hamper the described benefits that Finnish people and Finland as a country could yield 
from ride-sourcing services. If there exists an income threshold for having a license the 
bureaucracy should be kept very light. Otherwise market disturbances would lead to 
higher prices and lack of rides in certain areas. 
Uber backed up focusing license processing to one authority to keep administrative 
costs low and ease the work for entrepreneurs in transportation. They provided evidence 
for the self-employment with an EU study from 2015. Additionally Uber specifically 
requested that there would be clear statement that EU directive 1071/2009 (FI19) would 
not be applied to taxi transportation. The regulation in question determined common 
requirements and rules for a person or company to operate on item and personnel 
transportation. The biggest concern for Uber was the requirement for an official 
qualification for transporting personnel which in Finland was considered cumbersome. 
On a side note Uber hoped that a right to transport packages during personnel 
transportation would be included into the new law. This could add growth and economic 
transactions in many industries. 
Requirement for schedule and route information is unnecessary for Uber-like systems 
which would not be beneficial for passengers or drivers. Necessary information should 
take into consideration the different needs of various transportation services. The API 
and information sharing requirements should take into account the features of the 
systems. Concern about denying Uber’s dynamic pricing model would yield to lower 
efficiency rates. Also Uber would like a specific notion that companies do not need to 
share sensitive information like business secrets. Requirements should also keep in 
mind privacy aspects so that stakeholders do not suffer from them. For example opening 
up APIs for third parties might require substantial design, product and technical changes 
into the systems. These efforts might steal resources away from other work that might 
have bigger effect on Finnish economy, technology, innovations or productivity. 
Taxify supported lighter requirements for taxi license. Removing the regional taxi 
license quotas would support open competition. Zone based operations hurt the 
efficiency of taxi services. Lighter requirements for drivers and navigation systems 
create jobs and fair competition. Current maximum price level has led to price cartel 
inside taxi industry where providers charging lower fares get bad reputation which hurts 
efficient markets. Minimum barriers of entry with reasonable quality standards: no 
criminal records, drunk driving or serious traffic violations, active driver’s license, car 
insurance and inspection. Matchmaking platform should have feedback and reputation 
system. Proposed 10000€ income limit was seen reasonable. (FI16) 
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4.3 Amendment of law on vehicles 
After the decision had been made to deregulate taxi market the government noticed that 
the rephrasing (FI24) made to existing law on vehicles (FI23) regarding taximeters was 
unclear and contradicted with the new set of laws, especially with EU directive (FI25). 
The ambiguity was also reported by Väyrynen and Lanamäki (FI34) in 2020 when the 
amendment process for the law on transportation services started. 
4.3.1 Regulative legitimacy 
This conflict hindered the law’s intension to enable digital services and the last hurdle 
for regulative legitimacy for the ride-sourcing companies persisted. Originally the 
device was the only feasible way to try to guarantee consumer safety against frauds but 
due to the technological advancement this was no longer the case. As mentioned in the 
justifications of the amendment, the physical device has not been shown to protect 
consumers from frauds as argued earlier (Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer & Sutter, 
2013). Taxi meters are regulated on EU level with directive 2014/32/EU (FI25). 
However it gives the opportunity to member states to make adjustments to it and allow 
for example other measurement technologies if needed. Finnish government argued that 
ride-sourcing platforms offered transparent routing history thanks to GPS and mobile 
technologies which gave the consumers enough protection (FI12).  
The proposal (FI12) sought to amend three items on the law on vehicles: 
1) 25§ “if the price of the ride is based on measuring distance or time, the vehicle 
must use taximeter to define the price unless the ride is not ordered and paid via 
such technical interface that achieves sufficient reliability of measurement data 
and level of information security”  
2) 34§ “monitoring authority on taximeters is Finnish Transport and 
Communications Agency” 
3) 4§ “market monitoring authority regarding taximeters Finnish Transport and 
Communications Agency” 
First of these changes sought to remove the ambiguity between the amendment made to 
law on vehicles in 2017 (FI24) and law on transportation (FI03) and to clearly enable 
ride-sourcing platforms and their information systems be used in regular vehicles to 
measure and accept payments on transporting personnel. The latter two items were 
mainly to clarify the monitoring responsibilities among the authorities. 
Regardless of Uber’s efforts described below, the previously discussed three items on 
the law amendment were ultimately abandoned on 15.3.2019. Justification was that the 
previously discussed law on transportation services (FI03) had only been in effect less 
than a year and the traffic and communication committee wanted more evidence on its 
impact on taxi market. No other justifications were given for the decision. As a result 
the confusion remained of whether physical taximeter was required in cars using ride-
sourcing technology. 
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4.3.2 Legitimation efforts by Uber 
Again Uber tried to affect the legislation process by promoting technology neutral 
solutions which their own system could be counted as. From the company’s perspective 
the new technologies and innovations promoted consumer safety due to their accuracy 
and being able to predict final price versus the older tax meter. According to Uber the 
old technology resulted in high barrier of entry, limited competition and versatility of 
the available services. Special emphasis was put on showing how the Uber application 
was more sophisticated and better alternative than the old device. For example it 
allowed passengers to get price estimate before even making the order, real-time route 
information and share the routing details and estimated arrival time with other people. 
Uber also had UK court decision about the benefits of Uber from the consumer safety 
point of view and a certificate of California Division of Measurement Standards from 
2017 which proved that the application offered reliable and accurate way of defining the 
price of a ride based on geolocation data. (FI13) 
4.4 Amendment of the law on transportation services 
Already late 2018 the Ministry of Transport and Communications released a report on 
the effects of the Act to personal transportation market (FI04). While the results were 
not fully positive, the report did not recommend immediate changes on the new law but 
to gather more information on the effects first. On March 2019 the Ministry published a 
questions and answers regarding the problems expressed by public (FI05). It focused on 
defending the new law and emphasized the long term report that would be done in 2022.  
One year after the Act came effective, on July 2019, the Minister of Transportation and 
Communications announced that corrective actions would be taken in the form of 
amendment (FI06). Officially the work on the update on the legislation started on 
January 2020 (FI08) and again the public and private organizations were asked to 
comment on the legislative improvement. At the time of the writing of this study the 
proposal was pending final processing in the Finnish Parliament. 
4.4.1 Consequences of the law on transportation services 
In January 2020 the Tax Administration released a report of the effects of the law on 
transportation services had had on taxi market and the black market inside it (FI07) after 
1.7.2018. Unfortunately due to the hurried report schedule the tax administration did not 
have full year’s accounting details but the officials were still able to find some answers.  
The report investigated 1) how big effect tax industry has to tax revenue, 2) can the 
decline of the value added tax (VAT) be explained by black market and 3) does digital 
platform economy increase the risk for black market. Generally the taxi industry’s share 
of the tax revenue of Finland in total is small compared to for example other 
transportation industries. The decline on VAT income could be explained by new car 
purchases, subcontracting services and increase in gasoline prices. The effects of 
platform economy were hard to pinpoint due to multi-homing. Drivers were found to 
use multiple applications that forwarded rides and therefore the data was dispersed. 
Despite that the report did not detect any large scale tax avoidance.  
Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority released their report on taxi market 
(FI08) right after the Tax Administration. Major finding was that opening the market 
had led to higher prices while the law makers expected prices to decrease. According to 
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report this suggests forbidden price cooperation or organized region sharing between the 
players.  
Another key finding was the role of dispatching companies. They seemed to exercise 
considerable control over the taxi drivers for example in provisioning ride requests 
mainly to drivers who had agreed to certain on call duty hours and regions and by 
increasing membership fees considerably. Multi-homing, using more than one 
application for the same purpose, is not directly forbidden but it is difficult in practice 
due to technical regulations on car taping, brand visibility and forcing to use designated 
type of a taximeter. The report raised an example from Denmark where the competition 
had decreased significantly due to taxi companies buying smaller players. Therefore the 
regulation would need an update so that officials would have tools to continuously 
monitor the competitive landscape and improving multi-homing while making sure 
consumer knows who is responsible for each segment of the ordered ride. Regarding 
taximeters the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority report strongly advised to 
make two amendments. Firstly all fares should be forced to use taximeter, even the ones 
that are agreed in advance and are fixed. Secondly the law should clearly allow 
measuring the ride’s distance and price with software applications as well. It was also 
suggested that the dynamic pricing mechanism where the fee changes based on demand, 
would be taken into account. These changes would level the playground for all players, 
lower the barriers of entry, improve consumer’s safety and ease administrative work. 
Traffic and communication ministry wrote a memo where it opened up the background 
for the envisioned amendments and the officials’ view on the current problems of the 
taxi market. It requested feedback from private companies, associations, municipalities 
and other stakeholders. From the total 86 answers the ministry created a summary to 
support the political decision making (FI10). The summary was divided into six main 
themes: safety, quality, availability, pricing, preventing black market and dispatching 
centers. 
Authorities’ assessment on safety and quality in taxi market was seen overall correct 
and despite the problems safety was good in general. The feedback confirmed that the 
safety had decreased specifically in the transportation of special groups and in the 
interaction with them. Most of the existing taxi companies supported additional training 
of the drivers and emphasized ensuring drivers’ language proficiency in Finnish and 
Swedish, local knowledge and general entrepreneur education.  
According to the feedback, removing the regional quotas and on call requirement has 
hurt the availability in remote locations and smaller towns. On the other hand the areas 
with more dense population are over supplied by taxis. To find a cure to this problem 
the stakeholders suggest gathering more information and setting up standards by which 
the taxi and dispatching companies should report data to authorities. Taxi industry 
supported the idea about allowing the companies to agree together on common on call 
hours. 
While the summary was criticized about having only half a year tracking period of the 
effects of the deregulation, especially traditional taxi companies emphasized the 
problem is bigger than the report by tax administration (FI07) implied. Majority of taxi 
companies thought that new technology would be cheaper than the old taximeters and 
the most important was that every player would have the same obligations. On the 
contrary the Finnish Taxi Association was strongly against using anything else than 
physical taximeter. Finnish Tax Administration also thought that old taximeter was the 
best way to document actualized rides but if applications would be allowed, they should 
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be enforced to gather information for industry monitoring. Oulu University research 
group INTERACT highlighted two requirements for the taximeter regulation: 1) set 
preconditions when physical taximeter is not required and 2) define what kind of 
information the application meter should gather from the consumer and tax 
administration point of view. 
Majority of the respondents thought that officials did not have the full picture about the 
pricing after the 2018 reform of the transportation law. The reports had not taken into 
account the diversity of the new pricing structures nor the prices that dispatching centres 
had for phone ordering. Furthermore taxi entrepreneurs wanted more attention to the 
pricing of the taxis that do not use any dispatching services. Any settling of the prices 
between the players were seen problematic from the perspective of both competitive and 
EU law. While the requirement for showing a comparison price in the taxi window was 
good for the consumers in general it will still be difficult because of the versatile pricing 
structures that exist among the taxi entrepreneurs. Stakeholders did not think limiting 
the allowed pricing structures would be a solution to the pricing problems and it would 
hinder the development of new services. Moreover the maximum price was not either 
seen as an answer to the situation.  
Larger part of the feedback was concerned about the controlling effect that dispatching 
centres have to the taxi market and that it has not been given the attention it deserves in 
the law making process so far. This view was also visible in taxi entrepreneurs’ 
comments. Dispatching centres seem to have gathered a big portion of the ride 
agreements that are paid by Social Insurance Institution of Finland which form a 
significant share of the total taxi market. Additionally the dispatching centres are able to 
prevent the drivers of using competitors dispatching services. In general the activity of 
dispatching companies is interpreted as questionable from the competitive view point. 
4.4.2 Regulative legitimacy 
Based on the different official reports and gathered feedback the government gave its 
amendment proposal for transportation services early 2020 (FI11). The amendment had 
four main goals: 1) to increase service safety and quality by enforcing a course for 
drivers who will serve special groups such as people with disability and adjusting the 
contents of the taxi driver exam, 2) ensure the availability of taxi services by giving 
officials tools to monitor where and when there is demand for taxis, 3) prevent black 
market with stronger requirements for tax payment visibility and entrepreneurial 
education and 4) clarify the pricing both from the consumer and authority point of view.  
Table 3 lists the changes that affect to ride-sourcing platforms’ ways of operating and 
their regulative legitimacy. For the sake of readability the laws have been named after 
the legislative ID: law on transportation services 320/2017, law on road traffic 729/2018 
and law on vehicles 1090/2002. The table does not contain the changes or additions to 
the regulation regarding special groups since they are not considered target customers 
for ride-sourcing companies or their drivers due to their competitive tendering process 
requirements.  
  
34 
Table 3: Proposed changes in 2020 that affect the legitimacy of ride-sourcing platforms 
Effect to ride-
sourcing 
Contents of the law text Law Clause 
Makes it harder to 
recruit drivers 
Finnish Transportation and Communications Agency will 
grant taxi license to an individual, based on application, 
who has Finnish business ID and has successfully 
accomplished entrepreneur course described in this law’s 
section 6a 
320/2017 6§ 
Entrepreneur course for taxi transportation must include: 
- education on managing taxi company and legislation 
regarding taxation, accounting, salaries, social security, 
pension and insurance 
- minimum duration 21 hours 
- successful accomplishment requires accepted result on 
entrepreneur exam 
The course is organized by an organization who has been 
granted license by Finnish Transportation and 
Communications Agency 
320/2017 6a§ 
Taxi driver license is granted to a person who has 
successfully accomplished the taxi driver exam described in 
25a§. . Finnish Transportation and Communications 
Agency can grant a temporary certificate on the taxi driver 
license upon request. 
320/2017 25§ 
Taxi driver exam proves that the candidate has sufficient 
information, skills and expertise to perform as taxi driver. 
The exam must have questions about helping the passenger, 
ensuring safety, special needs of different customer groups, 
customer service situations and factors affecting 
transportation and traffic safety. Finnish Transportation and 
Communications Agency is responsible of organizing the 
exam. 
320/2017 25a§ 
Taxi license holder is responsible for having a device that 
collects at least the following information on each ride in 
electronic format: 
- entrepreneur identification details 
- vehicle identification details 
- driver identification details 
- time and date, length and duration of the ride 
320/2017 15a§ 
Feature 
requirements for 
platform and 
application 
The owner of the personnel transportation license and 
dispatching service provider must give the information on 
the total price of the ride including taxes or the basis of how 
the price will be calculated before the ride starts. The total 
price or the pricing information must be clearly stated and 
must be easily seen outside the vehicle. 
If the ride has not been ordered in advance or a fixed price 
has not been agreed the price of the ride must be based on 
length and duration of the journey. The ride have extra fees 
such as starting and other additional fees which are known 
to the customer beforehand. The pricing principles must not 
change during the journey. 
If the ride has not been ordered in advance or a fixed price 
has not been agreed, the personnel transportation license 
holder must give the passenger price information, including 
taxes, on example journey which length is 10 kilometers 
and duration 15 minutes. This example journey pricing 
must be easily seen outside the vehicle. 
Finnish Transportation and Communications Agency must 
monitor pricing of the transportation services offered to 
passengers and define the price of the example journey. The 
price must be specified to such a level that charging more 
than that can be seen to deviate substantially from the 
320/2017 152§ 
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general price level of taxi transportation services. This price 
must be examined annually. If there is a disagreement 
whether the price was agreed specifically or not the service 
provider has to prove their claim on the matter. If the price 
was not specifically agreed the price cannot exceed the 
example price set by the authority. 
Finnish Transportation and Communications Agency must 
monitor the general development of the pricing of the 
transportation services regionally. The holder of a personnel 
transportation license and dispatching service provider have 
an obligation to give the pricing information regarding the 
services they have provided or mediated to Finnish 
Transportation and Communication Agency periodically 
without pleading to trade secrets. 
Finnish Transportation and Communication Agency 
monitors the demand and supply of transportation services 
and evaluates the state and healthiness of the traffic system 
and reports about them regularly. 
Personnel transportation service provider has an obligation 
to, without pleading to trade secrets, periodically give the 
information about the provided or mediated services and the 
actualized data on demand categorized based on region and 
time. 
320/2017 179§ 
If the price of the ride is based on measuring distance or 
time during the journey, the vehicle must use a taximeter to 
define the price. The holder of the personnel transportation 
license is responsible for that during taxi transportation the 
vehicle has a taximeter or another device or system that 
reliably collects and stores the data described in 320/2017 
15a§. The collected information must be stored in such a 
manner that the contents cannot be altered or viewed or 
printed without difficulties. 
1090/2002 25§ 
Finnish Transportation and Communication Agency defines 
the additional technical specification on the taximeter or 
another device or system mentioned in 25§. 
1090/2002 27a§ 
Driver guidance 
required 
The owner of the personnel transportation license is 
responsible for 
- passenger has right to pay in cash and the most common 
payment cards if a specific payment option has not been 
clearly stated during the ordering or booking the ride 
- taxi operating license or a copy of it must be in the vehicle 
when it is used for personnel transportation 
Driver of the vehicle is responsible for 
- vehicle has taxi operating license or copy of it 
- passenger can see the name of the license owner, contact 
details and the name of the driver 
320/2017 151§ 
Extra 
requirements and 
costs to drivers 
Vehicle that is used to taxi transportation must have visible 
taxi sign 
729/2018 155§ 
 
The training for special group transportation would be voluntary so that it would not 
create an unnecessary barrier of entry. On the contrary the entrepreneur training would 
be brought back as mandatory but it would be significantly lighter than what it was 
before 2018. Furthermore the drivers would be required a business ID to call for better 
accounting and in electronic form to give the tax office more accurate information on 
taxi ride transactions.  
The amendment also contains physical equipment requirements for taxis. First the 
taximeter would still be required on rides where the price accuracy is based on the 
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length of the journey and time measurement. On fixed prices the taximeter would not be 
required. Nonetheless all taxis should have electronical system that gathers and saves 
the information defined in law: ride length, duration, used vehicle, driver name and 
date. Additional goal for this definition is to differentiate from the EU taximeter 
directive 2014/32/EU to avoid confusion. Second the taxis would again be required to 
use a light to help the consumers to identify them but it could be detachable to enable 
part-time driving too. 
Government suggested that taxis would be required to put a note about example price 
for 10 kilometer and 15 minute ride and use certain pricing structure if the ride has not 
been ordered beforehand. This would affect rides that are hailed from taxi stop but not 
the ones ordered via web site, mobile application or phone. The proposal especially 
notes that this change would not prohibit dynamic pricing since the price can be 
determined in advance. In order to enable better monitoring of the price level the taxi 
companies and dispatching centers would be enforced to deliver price information to 
traffic and communication office. 
The new amendment to transportation law would grant ride-sourcing companies 
regulative legitimacy to operate and use information technology to price their services 
before the ride takes place. However it would also introduce a slightly higher barrier of 
entry for new drivers.  
4.4.3 Legitimation efforts by Uber and other IT companies 
Three entities from IT sector commented the law proposal: Intelligent traffic association 
ITS Finland, taximeter and ride journal software company Ewooks Oy and ride-
sourcing company Uber Finland Oy. The first two were mainly concerned about the 
technology neutrality which in this case refers to a regulative barrier of entry that 
taximeter requisite creates especially in less densely populated areas (FI27, FI28). ITS 
Finland promoted enabling innovative mobile services and recognition of platform 
economy as one solution for answering to the demand of taxi services (FI27). Similarly 
Ewooks mentioned that balancing the taxi offering in rural areas requires support for 
sole traders and platform economy services (FI30). Ewooks also argued that GPS based 
solutions are more reliable and need less maintenance than physical taximeters and are 
mainly income redistribution for the traditional taxi companies. 
On general note Uber underlined the stated problems of the taxi market in the official 
reports have not been related to them. Also mobility applications such as Uber do not 
have enough leeway in cases where price is agreed in advance. They emphasized that 
the law needs to be flexible on situation if the customer changes the destination during 
the ride. The second concern about the proposal that Uber highlighted was the 
protection of personal data if taxi and dispatching companies are required to deliver data 
about the actualized ride data. In order to be compatible with European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the company suggested that office of the data 
protection would look into the matter too. (FI26) 
Uber stressed that the new amendment should recognize the different nature of rides 
hailed from taxi stop and the ones ordered in advance. The company promoted Estonia’s 
model from 2017 which protects the consumer who hails the taxi from the street but 
also enables the technological development and full use of new mobile services. From 
Uber’s point of view, supported by official reports (FI09), the consumer safety problems 
have not been in the pre-ordered rides and therefore the additional regulative measures 
should not target those. Extra education for the special groups was welcomed but should 
37 
consider only the vehicles fitted for that purpose. In general Uber saw that the 
companies offering ride services should already have incentives to keep the education of 
the drivers on good enough level and no extra mandatory training should be necessary. 
(FI29) 
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5. Findings 
The results of the study paint a picture about how protective legislation and incumbents 
struggle to adapt to new technological innovation. Similar to other countries, the 
resistance for the new players with overwhelming competitive advantage has been 
fierce also in Finland throughout the years. The findings gave insight to both of the 
research questions: how ride-sourcing platforms are regulated in Finland and how the 
same companies have sought to gain regulative legitimacy. The results are discussed 
separately in the following subchapters. 
5.1  Ride-sourcing regulation in Finland 
Before the reform of transportation law in 2018 the ride-sourcing platforms were 
practically illegal because of 1) strict entry and pricing regulation, 2) physical 
equipment requirements and 3) driver experience and education requirements. 
Technically ride-sourcing was not illegal but the various regulative constraints such as 
the requirement for a physical taximeter made it impossible to benefit from the key 
competitive advantages of digital platforms: technological innovation of matching 
passengers and drivers based on algorithms and not needing to employ the drivers 
directly. Summary of how the Finnish legislation has regulated the ride-sourcing 
platforms during 2007-2020 is presented in table 4 where bolded entry states a change 
in the state of the regulation. 
Table 4: Regulative constrains affecting ride-sourcing platforms in each legislative stage 
Before the 
reform of law 
on 
transportation 
services 
1.7.2007 – 
30.6.2018 
(FI03, FI20) 
After the reform of law on 
transportation services 1.7.2018 – 
31.12.2020 (FI03, FI24) 
Abandoned 
amendment to 
law on vehicles 
15.3.2019 (FI12) 
Proposed 
amendment of 
law on 
transportation 
services 1.1.2021 
onwards (FI11) 
Only certified 
taximeter 
device allowed 
to measure 
distance and 
price 
Also other devices or systems can be 
used to measure distance and price 
during the ride but they have to be as 
accurate and reliable as taximeter but 
should at the same time offer sufficient 
reliability of measurement data and 
information security. Unclear what the 
systems are and how they relate to EU 
directive. 
Clarify when 
"other devices or 
systems" can be 
used and what 
they are in 
relation to EU 
directive 
Taximeter or 
equivalent 
device is not 
needed if price is 
given and 
agreed in 
advance. No 
contraction to 
EU directive. 
Fixed pricing 
model and 
maximum 
price 
No pricing model or max price 
requirement if price is agreed in 
advance. If no fixed price is agreed 
beforehand the customer has to be 
informed about how the prices is being 
calculated. 
 No pricing model 
or max price 
requirement if 
price is agreed in 
advance. If no 
fixed price is 
agreed 
beforehand the 
customer has to 
be informed 
about how the 
prices is being 
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calculated. 
Fixed and 
regional taxi 
license quota 
issued by 
authorities 
No license quota or regional limitations  No license quota 
or regional 
limitations 
Prior 6 months 
experience as 
taxi driver 
required 
No previous experience required as taxi 
driver 
 No previous 
experience 
required as taxi 
driver 
No 
requirements 
to share 
information 
with officials 
Ambiguous ride information sharing 
requirements with officials 
 Specified ride 
information 
sharing 
requirements 
with officials 
No business ID 
required 
No business ID required  Business ID 
required 
Entrepreneur 
course 120 
hours 
No entrepreneur course  Entrepreneur 
course 21 hours 
Taxi driver 
exam 
Lighter taxi driver exam  Tightened taxi 
driver exam 
Taxi sign 
required 
No taxi sign required  Taxi sign 
required 
 
After the reform of 2018 the regulation on ride-sourcing became more permissive due to 
significantly lighter barriers of entry and removal of physical equipment and 
educational requirements. It made it easier for Uber to attract drivers since the taxi 
driver license policy was lightweight. Yet it still was far from the ideal situation where 
anyone could just download a mobile application and start driving people around 
without bureaucracy. Furthermore the authorities required adjustments to the 
information systems for information sharing purposes which as seen as a business risk 
from the trade secrets point of view.  Finally the Finnish legislation proved to be 
dispersed regarding the taxi market since not all limitations were removed in reform of 
transportation law. Afterward the law makers found out that the phrasing for measuring 
duration and length of the ride differed in two separate laws and made the interpretation 
so difficult that it hampered the use of new innovative technologies even in traditional 
taxi companies.  
The amendment process started in the beginning of 2020 seeks to clarify the 
contradicting interpretation of the two legislations, improve consumer protection and 
introduce service quality especially in the transportation of the special groups. From 
ride-sourcing platform point of view the amendment offers both good and bad news. 
Taxi meters would not be required in rides where the price has been agreed in advance 
and data from the journey is stored in electronical format. The law would specify which 
information should be stored about the journey and finally recognize the difference 
between rides hailed from street or taxi stop and rides pre-ordered through applications. 
Additional protective measure regarding pricing would only affect the former group.  
However the law would also require vehicles to have physical taxi sign, though 
detachable, when on duty. The cumbersome entrepreneur course removed earlier in the 
reform of transportation law would come back in a bit lighter form but would still 
increase the threshold of becoming a taxi driver. 
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5.2 Uber’s legitimation strategies for gaining regulative legitimacy 
The three different law making processes, the complete reform during 2015-2017, taxi 
meter amendment 2018 attempt and the 2020 amendment showed how ride-sourcing 
companies battled to affect to the phrasing of the new laws in their favor. The results of 
Uber’s latest comment document (FI26) could not be evaluated since the law process 
was still unfinished at the time of writing this thesis. Table 5 sums how the ride-
sourcing platforms commented the Finnish government proposals during the three 
different law processes.  
Table 5. Summary of the legitimation arguments of Uber during the three law making processes 
Reform of law on 
transportation services 
(FI15) 
Amendment of law on 
vehicles (FI13) 
Amendment of law on 
transportation services 
(FI26, FI29) 
Show support for the 
deregulation plans in general 
Promote allowing technology 
neutral solution 
Promote allowing technology 
neutral solution 
Emphasize the benefits of ride-
sharing for consumers and  
society 
Promote how new technology  
improve consumer safety vs 
the old 
Emphasize how the new 
platform economy provides 
one solution to taxi market 
problems  
Promote the more effective 
transportation and decrease in 
CO
2
 emissions  
Promote how new  technology 
are more reliable and accurate 
than the old 
Deny the connection of the 
current market disturbances 
to platform economy 
Advice dropping income limit 
and taxi license requirement 
Show certificate from US 
officials that proves the 
accuracy and reliability of the 
new technology 
Show concern towards the 
protection of personal data 
(GDPR) 
Point possible conflicts with 
EU directives 
 Require clarification of how 
the ride is ordered (hailing 
from street vs preordering) 
Concerns about information 
sharing would require 
disclosing sensitive data such 
as trade secrets 
 Claim that the market 
disturbances are not 
connected to preordering but 
hailing from street 
Require specific features from 
match-making / dispatching 
platforms 
 Promote extra driver 
education only for vehicles 
equipped for transporting 
special groups 
  Emphasize that ride-sourcing 
platforms are incentivized to 
educate their drivers 
 
The following subchapters discuss the legitimation arguments per law process in detail 
and what were the results of Uber’s arguments in the law proposal comments. The full 
list of the deducted arguments can be found on Appendix 2. 
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5.2.1 Comments on the reform of law on transportation services 
Significant majority, 14 of the total 19 recognized arguments, were found fully or 
partially from the final proposal or were removed as suggested by Uber. These 
arguments along with the one partially found argument are listed in table 6. The 
partially found argument (A17) wanted to make sure ride-sourcing companies would be 
able to protect their data from competitors. Yet the proposal disallowed discrimination 
but gave the data owner possibility to charge for the access to it. All normative based 
and almost all value based classes were found and the not found arguments were not 
showstoppers from ride-sourcing platform’s business model point of view.   
Table 6. Uber’s found and partially found arguments in the reform of law on transportation 2016 
proposal 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al., 2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
Implementation - successes Better utilization of private vehicles and 
decrease the need to own a a car and parking 
space requirements, refer to a two blogs 
about cars being parked 95% of time (A05) 
Yes 
Implementation - challenges Taxis and ride-sharing can co-exist, refer to 
American Public Transit Association report 
(A06) 
Yes 
Value - operational - rationale Service providers responsibility to enforce 
the driver’s requirements in Section 3 clause 
2 must be adhered (A11) 
Yes 
Value - business - rationale Productivity of taxi services increases (A04) Yes 
Technology neutral measurement of the 
price of the journey (A09) 
Yes 
New employment options and economic 
growth (A10) 
Yes 
It should be easier to become a taxi 
entrepreneur (A14) 
Yes 
Law should take into account the 
requirements of different transportation 
services regarding the “essential 
information” (A16) 
Yes 
Service providers should be able to put 
restrictions and rules for accessing their ride 
data (A17) 
Yes, 
partially 
Law should clearly state that information 
sharing does not require to disclose personal 
information, trade secrets or sensitive 
technical information (A18) 
Yes 
Normative - transformation Digitalization improves the reachability of 
the transportation services (A01) 
Yes 
Removal of license quotas improves 
employment and decreases traffic congestion 
(A07) 
Yes 
Removing the price ceiling improves the 
reliability of transportation (A08) 
Yes 
Advice removing the planned 10000€ annual 
income limit (A12) 
Yes 
 
The not found arguments are shown in Table 7. Two of them were mainly background 
information on Uber (A02, A03). One argument (A13) aimed to create extra regulation 
for Uber’s competitors, the traditional taxi companies, one (A15) tried to extend the taxi 
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operations to package delivery market and the final one (A19) tried to prevent extra 
development costs from the information sharing obligations. 
Table 7. Uber’s arguments not found in the reform of law on transportation 2016 proposal 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al., 2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
Diffusion - organizational Uber operates in 400 cities, 69 countries and 22 
EU Member States. Billion rides was reached 
end of 2015. Five million rides pers day. One 
million drivers world wide. (A03) 
No 
Diffusion - end user Uber has been downloaded over 100000 
Finnish persons. UberPOP has tens of 
thousands users in Helsinki area. (A02) 
No 
Value - financial - rationale Too wide information sharing obligations 
might create barriers of entry due to 
development costs (A19) 
No 
Value - operational - rationale Law should obligate taxi entrepreneur to 
disclose tax and transaction information to 
authorities per request (A13) 
No 
Value - business - rationale Taxis should be allowed to transport packages 
(A15) 
No 
 
Scrutinizing the strategy classes shows the early stages of the new innovation in the lack 
of regulative compliance strategies used. Majority of the legitimation discourse focuses 
on the business value such as making it easier to start driving a taxi or making too wide 
obligations for information sharing could create barriers of entry due to high 
development costs. Another largely used strategy was normative transformation where 
Uber highlighted the ongoing transformation of the taxi industry with the help of 
technological innovations. Only two arguments where about system functionality 
defining the ride-sourcing applications’ key features and attributes.  Other recognized 
strategies were related to diffusion, implementation and financial value. 
5.2.2 Comments on amendment of law on vehicles 
Four arguments could be considered found from the proposal for the amendment of the 
law on vehicles. They emphasized the benefits of technology neutrality (A20), 
improved consumer safety (A21) and distinguishing Uber’s application from the 
traditional taximeter with the help of UK court decision (A26). Also traditional 
taximeters negative effect on taxi market was pointed out (A24) as the purpose of the 
law was to enable software applications as a measurement system to lower the barrier of 
entry.  
Two arguments were partially found. Uber wanted the regulation to focus on letting the 
consumer know the final price of the journey instead of weighing the different 
technological options (A25). Indeed the final proposal focused on the final pricing but 
still kept the taximeter as the reference level on measuring the duration and length of the 
journey using comparison “as good as taximeter”. Secondly some of the Uber 
applications features (A27) ended up into the final proposal but not all. 
These found and partially found arguments are shown in table 8.  
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Table 8. Uber’s found and partially found arguments in the amendment of law on vehicles 2018 
proposal 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al. (2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
System - functionality Regulation should focus on making sure the 
consumer knows how much the ride is going to 
cost instead of specific way of measurement 
(A25) 
Yes, 
partially 
List of features why Uber application is more 
advanced than traditional taximeter (A27) 
Yes, 
partially 
Implementation - successes Technology helps tourists and improves overall 
consumer safety (A21) 
Yes 
Normative - transformation Technology neutral measurement of the price of 
the journey (A20) 
Yes 
Physical taximeter would decrease the diversity 
of transportation services (A24) 
Yes 
Regulative - compliance Uber is not a taximeter, refer to UK court 
decision (A26) 
Yes 
 
Five of the arguments were evaluated as unsuccessful. which are presented in table 9. 
The arguments tried to justify the legitimation with lowering the barriers of entry, 
improving the competitive landscape and referring Uber applications technical features 
and certificate from US authorities.  
Table 9. Uber’s unsuccessful arguments to amendment of law on vehicles 2018 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al. (2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
System - functionality Description of how Uber’s application measures 
length and duration of the ride (A29) 
No 
Value - business - rationale Lower the barrier of entry for new drivers (A22) No 
Improve driver’s ability to use multihoming, 
refer to Finnish Competition and Consumer 
Agency’s comment (A23) 
No 
Regulative - compliance Uber’s application benefits for consumer, refer 
to UK court decision (A28) 
No 
Uber’s application is reliable and accurate, refer 
to 1) NCWM regulation in United States and 2) 
Certificate of Approval from the California 
Type Evaluation Program (A30) 
No 
 
Argument strategies where split between implementation successes, normative 
transformation, system functionalities, business value and regulative compliance. 
Almost third of the argument falling into regulative compliance class indicate that the 
industry had evolved since the first legitimation attempt in the reform of law 
transportation in 2016. The results show that effort was made to prove that Uber’s 
application was “as good as taximeter”. 
5.2.3 Comments on amendment of the law on transportation 
services 
Total 47 arguments were recognized from the Uber’s official answer to the assessment 
memo (FI29) regarding the amendment of the law on transportation. Only 15 of these 
were considered found from the proposal. These arguments shown in table 10 were 
aimed to achieve competitive protection, clarify the role between hailed and pre-ordered 
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rides, well-defined information sharing requirements and emphasizing the need to 
improve public organizations transportation purchasing policies. Only normative, 
system and value based classes were represented in proposal. 
Uber stressed consumer protection and privacy (A32, A59, A42), competitive risks 
(A45), avoiding barriers for new drivers (A55), lightweight bureaucracy with 
information sharing requirements (A52) and easily understandable specifications for 
information systems (A51). Furthermore the ride-sourcing company criticized public 
organizations’ purchasing processes and tried to steer the officials’ regulative efforts 
from ride-sourcing applications to its main competitors, traditional taxi companies 
(A35, A39, A33, A64). 
Table 10. Uber’s arguments found in the assessment memo of the law on transportation 2020 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al. (2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
System - functionality Extra educational requirements should be 
targeted for drivers who use vehicles equipped 
for transporting special groups (A36) 
Yes 
Data driven decision making should use only 
aggregated data in order to protect privacy and 
competitive advantages (A43) 
Yes 
More accurate definition of minimum 
information that has to be supplied for officials 
would help current situation (A52) 
Yes 
Uber has transformed to pricing rides in 
advance in Finland. This offers the greatest 
possible transparency for consumer and is an 
example how technology improves user 
experience (A60) 
Yes 
System - configuration Possible taxi sign should be low cost, easy to 
install and detachable (A56) 
Yes 
Value - business - rationale Law should target potential extra requirements 
only for rides hailed from street (A40) 
Yes 
 Taxi companies ability to agree on on call 
duties pose risks of decreasing competition 
(A46) 
Yes 
 Pricing regulation should be consired only on 
rides hailed from street (A65) 
Yes 
Value - business - success story Estonian taxi regulation that protects consumer 
and at the same time enables new technology 
(A33) 
Yes 
Normative - transformation Consumer protection and safety of passengers 
must be ensured (A32) 
Yes 
Law should recognize the difference between 
hailing a taxi from street and pre-ordering it 
(A34) 
Yes 
Officials should investigate the availability on 
more accurate level and think about 
municipalies role in buying complementary taxi 
services (A42) 
Yes 
Kela should change the way it buys taxi 
services (A47) 
Yes 
Municipalies should consider outsourcing the 
transportation services to fix availability issues 
in remote areas (A48) 
Yes 
Supplying information for officials should 
utilize technology instead of being manual labor 
(A53) 
Yes 
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Additionally 5 arguments fell in to the category of partially found. They addressed black 
market problems (A50, A57), regulative monitoring (A58, A38) and pricing structure 
regulation (A63) and listed in table 11. 
Table 11: Uber’s arguments partially found in the assessment memo of the law on 
transportation 2020 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al. (2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
System - functionality Instead of regulation applications on precise 
level the officials should concentrate on tax 
information collected from dispatching services 
(A59) 
Yes, 
partially 
Implementation - successes Digital services such as Uber provide a good 
way to decrease black market. All payments are 
electronic and no cash is involved. All Uber 
drivers are required taxi license and taxi driver 
license (A51) 
Yes, 
partially 
Value - business - rationale Field monitoring should be targeted to sectors 
and providers based on feedback and 
complaints (A39) 
Yes, 
partially 
Pricing structure should not be regulated (A64) Yes, 
partially 
Normative - transformation Black market problems should be addressed 
with digital application (A58) 
Yes, 
partially 
 
Over half of the arguments, 27, never found their way to the proposal by the Finnish 
government. These arguments are listed in table 12. Their classes ranged from end user 
diffusion, implementation successes, both normative moral and transformation to 
regulative compliance, system functionality and value business. Argument A48 could 
have been put into alliance – adopter category but was finally considered to be more of 
an implementation - success story.  
Table 12: Uber’s arguments not found in the assessment memo of the law on transportation 
2020  
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al. (2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
System - functionality Uber technology ensures safety e.g. by warning 
about bike lanes (A35) 
No 
Uber ensures safety e.g. evaluation and 
feedback by users themselves (A38) 
No 
Best possible transparency for consumer is 
achieved by giving the total price of the ride in 
advance instead of the price of example ride 
(A63) 
No 
In Uber's service the technology helps the driver 
with choosing proficient route, helps with 
communication and giving feedback for both 
drivers and customers (A66) 
No 
Taxi driver exam's language skill requirements 
should not be increased (A69) 
No 
Implementation - successes City of Innisfil has bought the public 
transportation from Uber. Finland should 
consider similar solution (A49) 
No 
Driving Uber has offered opportunities for 
social climbing and job opportunities especially 
among immigrants. Reference to Uber's driver's 
unemployment background in Portugal, 
No 
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Belgium and France (A71) 
Diffusion - end user The share of foreign language speaking people 
of the total population in capital area is 
projected to increase to 23% until 2030 (A70) 
No 
Value - financial - rationale Lowering insurance costs would lower the 
threshold to enter the taxi market (A50) 
No 
Value - operational - rationale There is no need for testing the driver's 
expertise in practice. Companies and 
dispatching services are incentivized enough to 
take care of the service quality (A67) 
No 
Value - business - rationale Entering the market should not be tightened 
with additional license requirements (A37) 
No 
Data collection for officials should be light 
weight as possible. New obligation may harm 
small enterpreneurs significantly (A44) 
No 
Obligation to use physical taximeter would 
decrease competition, refer to Competition and 
Consumer Agency (A54) 
No 
Prerequisites for application based service 
providers should not be hindered in order to 
ensure healthy competition and market (A55) 
No 
Curriculum for drivers would increase the 
threshold to enter the market. Officials should 
investigate the quality of transportation more 
carefully before adding new obligations (A72) 
No 
Costs would increase significantly if companies 
would need to ensure the education of drivers 
on a level specified before 2018 reform and 
would create artificial barrier to use 
multihoming (A73) 
No 
Essential prerequisites for working competition 
and market development is making sure 
multihoming is supported. Monitoring the 
market should focus to this too (A75) 
No 
Normative - moral Consumer safety should be investigated 
especially in traditional taxi services and 
transportation of special groups (A31) 
No 
Survey results provide correct overview about 
the availability of taxi services (A41) 
No 
Normative - transformation Due to the time period the effects of the 
transportation law reform cannot be evaluated 
fully yet. New operation models may still 
develop to remote areas (A45) 
No 
Using external identifiers have unlikely effect 
on monitoring the industry. Monitoring should 
be based on technology such as identifying the 
registration plate (A57) 
No 
Statistic Center's statistics on pricing 
development is not accurate and does not take 
into account lower prices options (A61) 
No 
The way statistics are collected today does not 
fit in monitoring the overall status of 
developing market (A62) 
No 
Tightening the taxi driver exam requirements 
would increase unemployment especially 
among immigrants and long-term unemployed 
(A68) 
No 
Regulative - compliance Uber drivers are not required to use only Uber 
for getting rides. Regulation should support 
many kinds of working forms and their 
coupling (A74) 
No 
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There is no need for clarifying the fault and 
compensation regulation (A76) 
No 
There is no need for specific multihoming 
regulation because current legislation allows it 
already. Monitoring will ensure this will be 
possible in practice (A77) 
No 
 
Among the not found arguments were efforts to build positive image about the benefits 
of ride-sourcing to the society (A69, A48, A70) but mainly guidance to legislators not to 
create growth decreasing regulative mechanisms  that might have negative 
consequences to the taxi market (A67, A68, A36, A43, A53, A54, A71, A72). Other 
notable concern for Uber was taxi market monitoring and its practical measures (A56, 
A61, A75). Lastly the arguments showed emphasis on ride-sourcing applications 
features and advantages over traditional systems (A73, A34, A37, A62, A65). 
Uber also used the opportunity to comment the law proposal which was made based on 
various stakeholders’ responses to the assessment memo. In their response (FI26) 
shortly after the proposal came public Uber focused on two aspects: pricing and the 
obligations to share information with officials. Identified arguments are listed in table 
13. 
Table 13: Uber’s arguments used to influence the amendment of law on transportation 2020 
proposal 
Argument class (Kaganer et 
al. (2010) 
Argument (ID) In proposal 
System - functionality Information sharing should require only 
aggregated and periodical data from service 
providers (A83) 
Unknown 
Value - operational - rationale Current law proposal does not take into account 
situations where customer changes e.g. 
destination during journey. In cases with 
external changes emerge, service provider 
should be able to change a price (A80) 
Unknown 
Normative – moral There are situations that justify changing the 
price of the journey even if it is agreed in 
advance (A79) 
Unknown 
Information sharing requirements should take 
into account individual user's interest and 
privacy (A82) 
Unknown 
Normative - transformation Mobility applications give opportunity to wider 
group of people to use transportation services 
(A81) 
Unknown 
Regulative - compliance The pricing functionality of Uber's platform is 
aligned with government proposal (A78) 
Unknown 
Information sharing requirements should adhere 
GDPR regulation (A84) 
Unknown 
 
At the time of writing this thesis the proposal had not been addressed in Finnish 
parliament so it cannot be said which of them ended to the final proposal.    
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6. Discussion 
This thesis aimed to answer the research questions of how the ride-sourcing platforms 
are regulated in Finland and what kind of legitimacy strategies they use to gain 
regulative legitimacy. This chapter first discusses the development of the ride-sourcing 
regulation in Finland, then the legitimation strategies surfaced by the IT legitimation 
taxonomy by Kaganer et al. (2010) and finally how the findings of the study relate to 
previous literature. 
6.1 The development of ride-sourcing regulation in Finland 
The changes in the Finnish regulative landscape toward ride-sourcing show the same 
signs as in other countries so far. Two-sided market winner-take-all competition fuels 
aggressive strategies employed by ride-sourcing companies and create pressure for 
regulators to address both deregulation of taxi market and enhance antimonopoly tools. 
At the same time incumbents of the taxi market have tried to hinder technology 
companies’ legitimation efforts by any means available.  
Despite the academic consensus referring to ride-sourcing (Frenken & Schor, 2017) 
with companies such as Uber and Lyft, the term ride-sharing is still present both in 
Uber’s as well as in the Finnish authorities’ terminology. Yet in the actual government 
proposals and in Uber’s arguments to the given proposals the phrase sharing was not 
present. 
Finnish taxi legislation was quite similar to US (Dempsey, 1996) and other European 
countries (Frazzani et al., 2016) before the reform. Also the recorded problems after the 
reform have been similar to the experiences in United States (Dempsey, 1996) 
especially around Helsinki-Vantaa airport (Uhari, 2018). After making similar mistakes 
as in US the Finnish authorities are trying to carefully reregulate taxi market the way 
Moore and Balaker suggested (2006). The ongoing amendment process in Finland seeks 
to make it slightly harder to recruit drivers, require new features from the central 
platform and mobile application in addition to introducing small starting costs to drivers 
and requiring the platform company to better instruct their drivers.  
6.2 IT legitimation taxonomy as a lens to regulative change process 
The study made an attempt to categorize Uber’s legitimation strategies according to the 
IT legitimation taxonomy by Kaganer et al. (2010). The original taxonomy was created 
from a setting where a new industry product sought legitimation in the eyes of the 
potential customers and regulative legitimacy was only one of the strategies used. In this 
study the whole purpose of the legitimation strategies were to gain regulative 
legitimacy. The potentials buyers in this case are the law makers, politicians and 
officials. Despite the difference in the research setting the study shows that the IT 
legitimation taxonomy works well as the framework for categorizing the regulative 
legitimation efforts of an IT company that seeks to enter a new market protected by 
existing legislation.  
Not all strategies identified by Kaganer et al. (2010) were identified in this study. This 
was partly due to the different nature of the information system and partly due the target 
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organization and environment. The authors studied the vendor discourse around a new 
clinical information system to sell it to new organizations whereas this study 
investigated the efforts of a ride-sourcing company during a law making process in the 
hopes of swaying the law makers and to forge favourable legislation. Additionally 
regulative legitimacy was only one of the 26 discursive strategies identified by Kaganer 
et al. compared to this study where Uber used much of the IT taxonomy strategy arsenal 
to gain solely regulative legitimacy. 
The original strategies included a few medical related categories, value – clinical – 
rationale and value – clinical –success story which were not found and were not 
expected to be found in ride-sourcing context. The other categories missing were 
financial, operational and IT success stories, IT rationale plus alliance and reputation 
related strategies. Given that ride-sourcing has existed already a decade it is peculiar 
that Uber did not rely more on the success stories and alliances. Could it be that the 
winner takes it all competition does not favour partnerships in general or that Uber has 
grown so big that it does not forge those anymore? Given the background material 
found from Finnish newspapers and the ongoing disputes on employee rights elsewhere 
in the world it is understandable that the reputation strategies were also not present in 
the findings.  
6.3 Uber’s strategies in Finland compared to previous literature 
In his research Suchman (1995) suggested that an organization has three different 
legitimacy building strategy groups to select from when building legitimacy: the 
organization can 1) adapt to the existing rules made by incumbents, 2) carefully choose 
a target environment in order to find a favourable audience or 3) manipulate the 
environment in the hopes of building new audience and sympathetic beliefs. Uber’s 
efforts in Finland fell into Suchman’s (1995) third category.  
The regulative compliance category identified by Kaganer et al. (2010) was only found 
in its original form in the second law process when Uber used the certificate of approval 
from the California Type Evaluation Program. This suggests that ride-sourcing 
applications do not have many relevant certificates recognized by national agencies yet 
they could lean on for legitimacy. While ride-sourcing platforms have been around 
already a decade their legal position is still unstable. Regardless of that Uber tried to 
build legitimacy with different discourse strategies in Finland and used various 
documents loosely where applicable while arguing for the benefits of ride-sourcing 
applications regulative compliance.  
During the reform of the Finnish law on transportation Uber initially emphasized how 
opening the taxi market would lead to better services and quality for the consumers 
despite the negative evidence found from previous research (Moore and Balaker 2006). 
They also argued that keeping the taxi license quota would prevent decreasing traffic 
congestion and private car ownership but also this has been shown to be untrue at least 
in the short run (Guo, Li & Zeng, 2019). Due to the chosen material collection methods 
this study was unable to capture the gradual social embedding activities suggested by 
Fan et al. (2019) and Tseng and Chang (2019) but it is very likely that such efforts still 
took place. 
Key competitive advantage of the ride-sourcing companies is not to employ drivers or 
own vehicles themselves and therefore saving considerably in employee costs and 
capital expenses (De Stefano & Aloisi, 2018; Thelen, 2018). Interestingly this did not 
come up in the official documents at all but given the recent development of labor law 
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disputes in Europe (Booth, 2020; Rosemain & Vidalon, 2020) and in US (Ivanova, 
2020) it is likely that similar discussions will start in Finland too. The fight over the 
legitimacy of ride-sourcing platforms in Finland is far from over and the next battle 
already awaits around the corner. Additionally the labor law issues do not only consider 
ride-sourcing companies but the whole gig economy where digital platforms try to 
utilize individual’s work effort as subcontractors instead of employees. 
From sustainable business perspective the relentless seeking for growth through 
network effects has still not been effective for Uber since the company has never made 
profit yet (Uber, 2020c). That and the heating labor law disputes give credit to the 
forecast by Goletz (2019) where self-driving cars are the only option for ride-sourcing 
companies to become profitable and survive. 
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7. Conclusions 
This thesis aimed to answer the research questions of how are ride-sourcing 
organizations regulated in Finland and what kind of legitimacy strategies they use to 
gain regulative legitimacy. First it tells the story of how the closed taxi market in 
Finland has opened up to welcome the new ride-sourcing platforms after a few missteps. 
Second it demonstrates how the IT legitimacy taxonomy by Kaganer et al. (2010) can 
be used to understand the legitimation strategies of a private organization during a law 
making process in the hopes of establishing regulative legitimacy in the future. 
The study revealed how ride-sourcing platforms were illegal before the reform of 
transportation law in 2018. However companies such as Uber still started the operations 
in the country already 2014. This shows that the digital platforms’ typical race for the 
network effects was also present in Finland and contributed to the hasty reform process 
of the Finnish laws on transportation. Deregulation process of the taxi market in Finland 
took similar turns as witnessed in US before the new millennia and before ride-sourcing 
even existed. The Finnish regulation today allows ride-sourcing companies to operate in 
Finland with the prerequisite that the final price is agreed with the customer beforehand. 
Additionally it obligates the platform companies to provide the officials with specified 
data about the actualized rides periodically. The drivers offering rides in the two-sided 
marketplace have to apply for taxi driver license, have a business ID and successfully 
pass entrepreneur course and taxi driver exam. Finally the cars on duty must have at 
least detachable taxi sign. 
During the three law processes Uber commented each of them. In first reform of the law 
on transportation services in 2018 and the last one, still pending approval from the 
parliament 2020, Uber was able to lobby business critical items in their favour. The 
second process, amendment on law on vehicles, was abandoned because too little time 
had passed after the 2018 reform came effective. The arguments that either were not 
used in government’s proposal were not critical for ride-sourcing. In the latest, 
amendment on law on transportation, a few already removed barriers of entry were 
brought back. However these probably will not pose significant business threat for ride-
sourcing companies and the overall law became much clearer for them. Despite the 
favourable conditions today a bigger issue is bubbling under the surface in the form of 
labour law. The key competitive advantage of digital platforms mediating work is the 
lack of employment costs. In big countries such as France, UK and US the court 
verdicts have been adverse for two-sided marketplaces so far and similar disputes can 
be expected in Finland. 
This study has several practical implications. Firstly it gives an overview of the 
regulative risks in Finland for a company that plans to enter in ride-sourcing or gig 
platform market in general. Secondly it shows the benefit of building alternative 
business models for scenarios where the law makers have to make adjustments to their 
initial deregulation decisions instead of betting too much into one model. Thirdly it 
raises the question of how much the platform economy can save in the employee costs 
before it hurts the business and the welfare of the society it seeks to gain profit from in 
the first place. Finally it provides evidence to law makers that despite the cultural 
differences there are lessons to be learned from the similar deregulation efforts done in 
other countries.  
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The research has several limitations. Firstly the collected material only contained 
secondary data as no interviews were made. This might leave important insights about 
ride-sourcing companies’ attempts and strategies to affect the law making hidden.  
Secondly focusing only to Uber’s comments on the law proposals gives the impression 
that all successful arguments were due to Uber’s efforts. It is likely that at least some of 
the arguments were shared by other organization affected by the law proposal too. 
Thirdly since the study did not compare Uber’s arguments to original documents which 
Uber responded to in 2016, it cannot be said if the arguments were made up by officials 
which Uber then leant into or if they were devised by Uber. 
Given the limitations the future research should try to interview the key stakeholders 
working at Uber Finland at the time of the law processes who were actively trying to 
influence decision makers in order to learn detailed information on the legitimation 
strategies. Additional interesting research avenue would be to investigate what kind of 
legitimation strategies Uber and other ride-sourcing companies have used in other 
Nordic countries and compare them to the results of this study. With the help of larger 
case data the IT taxonomy of Kaganer et al. (2010) could be transformed to better to the 
angle of influencing law making processes. 
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selvitys 
Report Finland 21.1.
2020 
25.8.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/ee535
59d-a2d8-4dbc-8ee2-
2fed339774da/RAPO
RTTI_20200121071
436.pdf 
FI10 Päivitetty 
lausuntoyhteenveto 
taksisääntelyn 
toimivuuden 
arviomuistiosta 
Report Finland 28.4.
2020 
25.8.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/159e9
483-164e-41b5-
9a00-
03c7aaddb749/YHT
EENVETO_2020042
8080026.pdf 
FI11 Hallituksen esitys 
eduskunnalle laeiksi 
liikenteen palveluista 
annetun lain, 
tieliikennelain 155 
§:n sekä 
ajoneuvolain 25 ja 27 
a §:n muuttamisesta 
Law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 11.6.
2020 
24.8.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/1f3ddc
59-ad86-4768-a166-
ab19b0303009/KIRJ
E_20200611064812.
PDF 
FI12 Hallituksen esitys 
HE 86/2018 vp 
(taksamittari) 
Law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 13.6.
2018 
27.8.2020 https://www.eduskun
ta.fi/pdf/HE+86/2018  
FI13 Asiantuntijalausunto 
- Uber, HE 86/2018 
vp (official 
comment) 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 16.1
0.20
18 
24.8.2020 https://www.eduskun
ta.fi/FI/vaski/Julkais
uMetatieto/Documen
ts/EDK-2018-AK-
214124.pdf 
FI14 Uberin ohjeet 
taksiluvan 
hakemiseen 
Guide Finland 3.9.2
020 
3.9.2020 https://www.uber.co
m/fi/fi/drive/require
ments/get-a-license/  
FI15 Uberin lausunto; 
Hallituksen esitys 
liikennekaareksi 
LVM076:00/2015 
PDF 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 23.5.
2016 
7.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/ded38
66c-62f8-4f2c-aac1-
0878f90dfa9f/7268b
dda-b7a9-4ebc-bff0-
9c6211252d6d/LAU
SUNTO_201605231
31501.PDF 
FI16 Taxifyn lausunto; 
Hallituksen esitys 
liikennekaareksi 
LVM076:00/2015 
PDF 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 23.5.
2016 
7.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/ded38
66c-62f8-4f2c-aac1-
0878f90dfa9f/04dc9c
18-83f0-460f-8680-
bc9c15f6a530/LAUS
UNTO_2016052310
1501.PDF 
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FI17 Valiokunnan 
mietintö LiVM 37/20
18 vp koskien HE 
86/2018 
Commit
tee 
report 
Finland 31.1.
2019 
8.9.2020 https://www.eduskun
ta.fi/FI/vaski/Mietint
o/Sivut/LiVM_37+2
018.aspx 
FI18 Hovioikeus: Uber-
taksiliikenne laitonta 
– kyytien tuotot 
valtiolle 
News 
article 
Finland 21.9.
2016 
8.9.2020 https://yle.fi/uutiset/3
-9181559 
FI20 Taksiliikennelaki 
(kumottu) 
Law Finland 1.7.2
007 
10.9.2020 https://www.finlex.fi/
fi/laki/ajantasa/kumo
tut/2007/20070217 
FI21 Laki 
taksiliikennelain 
muuttamisesta 
Law 
amend
ment 
Finland 26.6.
2009 
10.9.2020 https://www.finlex.fi/
fi/laki/alkup/2009/20
090482 
FI22 Traficom - 
taksikuljettajan 
ajolupa 
Web 
page 
Finland 1.1.2
020 
10.9.2020 https://www.traficom
.fi/fi/asioi-
kanssamme/taksinkul
jettajan-ajolupa 
FI24 Laki ajoneuvolain 25 
ja 27 a §:n 
muuttamisesta 
Law 
amend
ment 
Finland 24.5.
2017 
10.9.2020 https://www.finlex.fi/
fi/laki/alkup/2017/20
170321 
FI26 Uberin lausunto: 
LVM025:00/2019 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 8.7.2
020 
10.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/01b7e
871-e680-43b2-
b47e-
0114f24b93fa/LAUS
UNTO_2020070812
2455.PDF 
FI27 ITS Finland ry 
lausunto 
LVM025:00/2019 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 6.7.2
020 
16.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/6da3fe
00-8a21-4692-ab62-
2c1944cb75d8/LAU
SUNTO_202007060
92744.PDF 
FI28 Ewooks Oy lausunto 
LVM025:00/2019 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 1.7.2
020 
16.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/e14e6
b50-1852-446e-
b26b-
a72666a2fe12/LAUS
UNTO_2020070608
1154.PDF 
FI29 Uberin arviomuistio: 
LVM025:00/2019 
Comme
nt on 
law 
proposit
ion 
Finland 21.2.
2020 
16.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/0d59b
1db-070b-4bbb-
a7cb-
62 
fad163416ab5/LAUS
UNTO_2020042306
0638.PDF 
FI30 Ewooks Oy 
arviomuistio 
LVM025:00/2019 
 Finland 9.2.2
020 
16.9.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/5980b
990-8dee-44a8-9f52-
39ab584f09d5/LAUS
UNTO_2020042305
5510.PDF 
FI32 Uber ohjeita 
matkustajille 
Docum
entation 
Finland 29.9.
2020 
29.9.2020 https://help.uber.com
/fi-
FI/riders/section/lis%
C3%A4%C3%A4?n
odeId=6477a37b-
3faa-42b0-8b01-
677bc61d3ea4 
FI33 Taksiliitto: Poliisi 
selvittelee syyttäjän 
kanssa nyt sitä, 
syyllistyykö Uber 
avunantorikoksiin 
News 
article 
Finland 2.1.2
017 
29.9.2020 https://www.hs.fi/tal
ous/art-
2000005028880.html  
FI34 Suomen 
taksamittarisääntelyn 
monitulkintaisuus 
Report Finland 1.10.
2020 
1.10.2020 https://interact.oulu.fi
/site/files/2020-
02/interact-2-
2020.pdf 
FI35 Arviomuistio 
Taksisääntelyn 
toimivuus 
lausuntoversio 
Report Finland 22.5.
2020 
2.10.2020 https://api.hankeikku
na.fi/asiakirjat/c4077
dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/825f7
d48-7ba1-4914-
9195-
777b898d6e6c/KIRJ
E_20200522110243.
PDF 
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Appendix 2 
ID Argument Argum
ent 
locatio
n 
(sectio
n) 
Argument class 
(Kaganer et al. 
(2010) 
Proposal 
entry 
location 
In 
proposal 
Remark Law proposal 
A01 Digitalization 
improves the 
reachability of 
the 
transportation 
services 
p1 
(1.1) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p7 (1) Yes Proposal 2016 
A02 Uber has been 
downloaded 
over 100000 
Finnish 
persons. 
UberPOP has 
tens of 
thousands 
users in 
Helsinki area. 
p2 
(1.3) 
Diffusion - end 
user 
 No Not found 2016 
A03 Uber operates 
in 400 cities, 
69 countries 
and 22 EU 
Member 
States. Billion 
rides was 
reached end of 
2015. Five 
million rides 
pers day. One 
million drivers 
world wide. 
p2 
(1.3) 
Diffusion - 
organizational 
 No Not found 2016 
A04 Productivity 
of taxi 
services 
increases 
p3 
(2.1) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p108 
(4.1.4) 
Yes Proposal 2016 
A05 Better 
utilization of 
private 
vehicles and 
decrease the 
need to own a 
a car and 
parking space 
requirements, 
refer to a two 
blogs about 
cars being 
parked 95% of 
time 
p3 
(2.2) 
Implementation 
- successes 
p109 
(4.1.4) 
Yes Proposal 2016 
A06 Taxis and p3 Implementation p99 (4.1.2) Yes Proposal 2016 
64 
ride-sharing 
can co-exist, 
refer to 
American 
Public Transit 
Association 
report 
(2.3) - challenges 
A07 Removal of 
license quotas 
improves 
employment 
and decreases 
traffic 
congestion 
p4 
(3.1) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p9 (1) Yes Proposal 2016 
A08 Removing the 
price ceiling 
improves the 
reliability of 
transportation 
p4 
(3.2) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p98 (4.1.2) Yes Proposal 2016 
A09 Technology 
neutral 
measurement 
of the price of 
the journey 
p4 
(3.3) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p101 
(4.1.2) 
Yes Proposal 2016 
A10 New 
employment 
options and 
economic 
growth 
p5 
(4.1) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p119 Yes Proposal 2016 
A11 Service 
providers 
responsibility 
to enforce the 
driver’s 
requirements 
in Section 3 
clause 2 must 
be adhered 
p6 
(4.2) 
Value - 
operational - 
rationale 
p195 (2§) Yes Proposal 2016 
A12 Advice 
removing the 
planned 
10000€ annual 
income limit  
p6 
(4.3) 
Normative - 
transformation 
 Yes Removed  2016 
A13 Law should 
obligate taxi 
entrepreneur 
to disclose tax 
and 
transaction 
information to 
authorities per 
request 
p6 
(4.4) 
Value - 
operational - 
rationale 
 No Not found 2016 
A14 It should be 
easier to 
become a taxi 
entrepreneur 
p6 
(5.2) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p2 (1) Yes Proposal 2016 
A15 Taxis should 
be allowed to 
transport 
packages 
p7 
(5.2) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2016 
A16 Law should 
take into 
p7 (6) Value - business 
- rationale 
p181 Yes Proposal 2016 
65 
account the 
requirements 
of different 
transportation 
services 
regarding the 
“essential 
information”  
A17 Service 
providers 
should be able 
to put 
restrictions 
and rules for 
accessing their 
ride data 
p8 (6) Value - business 
- rationale 
p153 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal and 
law. Any 
discrimination 
was prohibited 
but fees could 
be charged 
2016 
A18 Law should 
clearly state 
that 
information 
sharing does 
not require to 
disclose 
personal 
information, 
trade secrets 
or sensitive 
technical 
information 
p8 (6) Value - business 
- rationale 
p181, p176 Yes Proposal 2016 
A19 Too wide 
information 
sharing 
obligations 
might create 
barriers of 
entry due to 
development 
costs  
p8 (6) Value - 
financial - 
rationale 
p176 No Estimated that 
the required 
changes 
would not 
represent 
significant 
costs 
compared to 
dispatching 
service 
providers 
revenue 
2016 
A20 Technology 
neutral 
measurement 
of the price of 
the journey 
p1 Normative - 
transformation 
p18 Yes Proposal 2018 
A21 Technology 
helps tourists 
and improves 
overall 
consumer 
safety  
p2 Implementation 
- successes 
p16 Yes Proposal 2018 
A22 Lower the 
barrier of 
entry for new 
drivers 
p2 Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2018 
A23 Improve 
driver’s ability 
to use 
multihoming, 
refer to 
Finnish 
p2 Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2018 
66 
Competition 
and Consumer 
Agency’s 
comment 
A24 Physical 
taximeter 
would 
decrease the 
diversity of 
transportation 
services 
p2 Normative - 
transformation 
p18 Yes Proposal 2018 
A25 Regulation 
should focus 
on making 
sure the 
consumer 
knows how 
much the ride 
is going to 
cost instead of 
specific way 
of 
measurement  
p2 System - 
functionality 
p16 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal. 
Focus on 
letting the 
customer 
know the 
price 
beforehand 
but keep the 
taximeters as 
the reference 
level of 
measurement. 
2018 
A26 Uber is not a 
taximeter, 
refer to UK 
court decision  
p3 Regulative - 
compliance 
p16 Yes Proposal. EU 
directive 
2014/32/EU 
does not 
prevent using 
other devices 
to measure 
price in 
transportation 
services 
2018 
A27 List of 
features why 
Uber 
application is 
more 
advanced than 
traditional 
taximeter 
p3 System - 
functionality 
p17 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal 
2018 
A28 Uber’s 
application 
benefits for 
consumer, 
refer to UK 
court decision 
p3 Regulative - 
compliance 
 No Not found 2018 
A29 Description of 
how Uber’s 
application 
measures 
length and 
duration of the 
ride 
p4-5 System - 
functionality 
 No Not found 2018 
A30 Uber’s 
application is 
reliable and 
accurate, refer 
to 1) NCWM 
regulation in 
United States 
p5 Regulative - 
compliance 
 No Not found 2018 
67 
and 2) 
Certificate of 
Approval 
from the 
California 
Type 
Evaluation 
Program 
A31 Consumer 
safety should 
be 
investigated 
especially in 
traditional taxi 
services and 
transportation 
of special 
groups. 
p2 (3.) Normative - 
moral 
 No Not found 2020a 
A32 Consumer 
protection and 
safety of 
passengers 
must be 
ensured 
p2 (4.) Normative - 
transformation 
p23 (3) Yes Proposal 2020a 
A33 Estonian taxi 
regulation that 
protects 
consumer and 
at the same 
time enables 
new 
technology 
p2 (4.) Value - business 
- success story 
p49, p50, 
p51 (5.2) 
Yes Proposal 2020a 
A34 Law should 
recognize the 
difference 
between 
hailing a taxi 
from street 
and pre-
ordering it 
p2 (4.), 
p7 
(20.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p28 (3), 
p64 (152§) 
Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A35 Uber 
technology 
ensures safety 
e.g. by 
warning about 
bike lanes 
p2 (4.) System - 
functionality 
 No Not found 2020a 
A36 Extra 
educational 
requirements 
should be 
targeted for 
drivers who 
use vehicles 
equipped for 
transporting 
special groups 
p3 (5.), 
p3 (6.), 
p11 
(37.), 
p11 
(38.) 
System - 
functionality 
p23 (3) Yes Proposal. 
Partially in 
law. Also 
entrepreneurs 
education 
would be 
introduced. 
2020a 
A37 Entering the 
market should 
not be 
tightened with 
additional 
license 
p3 (5.) Value - business 
- rationale 
p74 (18§) No Not found. 
Additional 
license 
requirements 
proposed 
2020a 
68 
requirements 
A38 Uber ensures 
safety e.g. 
evaluation and 
feedback by 
users 
themselves 
p3 (5.) System - 
functionality 
 No Not found 2020a 
A39 Field 
monitoring 
should be 
targeted to 
sectors and 
providers 
based on 
feedback and 
complaints. 
p4 (8.) Value - business 
- rationale 
 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal, 
Partially in 
law. Field 
monitoring 
would mainly 
be targeted to 
curriculums 
for 
entrepreneurs 
and special 
groups 
2020a 
A40 Law should 
target 
potential extra 
requirements 
only for rides 
hailed from 
street 
p4 (9.), 
p7 
(20.), 
p10 
(34.), 
p12 
(44.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p28 (3), 
p64 (152§) 
Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A41 Survey results 
provide 
correct 
overview 
about the 
availability of 
taxi services 
p4 
(11.) 
Normative - 
moral 
 No Not found 2020a 
A42 Officials 
should 
investigate the 
availability on 
more accurate 
level and 
think about 
municipalies 
role in buying 
complementar
y taxi services 
p4 
(12.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p23 (3) Yes Proposal 2020a 
A43 Data driven 
decision 
making should 
use only 
aggregated 
data in order 
to protect 
privacy and 
competitive 
advantages 
p5 
(13.) 
System - 
functionality 
p55 (15a§) Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A44 Data 
collection for 
officials 
should be 
light weight as 
possible. New 
obligation 
may harm 
p5 
(13.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
69 
small 
enterpreneurs 
significantly. 
A45 Due to the 
time period 
the effects of 
the 
transportation 
law reform 
cannot be 
evaluated 
fully yet. New 
operation 
models may 
still develop 
to remote 
areas. 
p5 
(14.), 
p5 
(15.), 
p5 
(16.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
 No Not found 2020a 
A46 Taxi 
companies 
ability to 
agree on on 
call duties 
pose risks of 
decreasing 
competition. 
p5 
(17.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p12 (2.2), 
p47 (5.1.4) 
Yes Proposal 2020a 
A47 Kela should 
change the 
way it buys 
taxi services 
p6 
(18.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p5 (1.1) Yes Proposal 2020a 
A48 Municipalies 
should 
consider 
outsourcing 
the 
transportation 
services to fix 
availability 
issues in 
remote areas 
p6 
(18.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p25 (4.1) Yes Proposal 2020a 
A49 City of 
Innisfil has 
bought the 
public 
transportation 
from Uber. 
Finland 
should 
consider 
similar 
solution. 
p6 
(18.) 
Implementation 
- successes 
 No Not found 2020a 
A50 Lowering 
insurance 
costs would 
lower the 
treshold to 
enter the taxi 
market 
p6 
(18.) 
Value - 
financial - 
rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
A51 Digital 
services such 
as Uber 
provide a 
good way to 
p6 
(19.), 
p7 
(21.) 
Implementation 
- successes 
 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal 
2020a 
70 
decrease black 
market. All 
payments are 
electronic and 
no cash is 
involded. All 
Uber drivers 
are required 
taxi license 
and taxi driver 
license. 
A52 More accurate 
definition of 
minimum 
information 
that has to be 
supplied for 
officials 
would help 
current 
situation 
p7 
(22.) 
System - 
functionality 
p14 (2.3), 
p54 (15a§) 
Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A53 Supplying 
information 
for officials 
should utilize 
technology 
instead of 
being manual 
labor 
p8 
(24.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p14 (2.3), 
p16 (2.3) 
Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A54 Obligation to 
use physical 
taximeter 
would 
decrease 
competition, 
refer to 
Competition 
and Consumer 
Agency 
p8 
(25.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
A55 Prerequisites 
for application 
based service 
providers 
should not be 
hindered in 
order to 
ensure healthy 
competition 
and market  
p8 
(25.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
A56 Possible taxi 
sign should be 
low cost, easy 
to install and 
detachable 
p8 
(26.) 
System - 
configuration 
p29 (4.1.3) Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A57 Using external 
identifiers 
have unlikely 
effect on 
monitoring the 
industry. 
Monitoring 
should be 
p8 
(26.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
 No Not found 2020a 
71 
based on 
technology 
such as 
identifying the 
registration 
plate. 
A58 Black market 
problems 
should be 
addressed 
with digital 
application 
p9 
(27.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
p14 (2.3) Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal, 
Partially in 
law. Not 
digital 
application 
but in 
electronic 
format. 
2020a 
A59 Instead of 
regulation 
applications 
on precise 
level the 
officials 
should 
concentrate on 
tax 
information 
collected from 
dispatching 
services 
p9 
(27.) 
System - 
functionality 
p1 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal, 
Partially in 
law 
2020a 
A60 Uber has 
transformed to 
pricing rides 
in advance in 
Finland. This 
offers the 
greatest 
possible 
transparency 
for consumer 
and is an 
example how 
technology 
improves user 
experience. 
p9 
(28.) 
System - 
functionality 
p30 (4.1.4) Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A61 Statistic 
Center's 
statistics on 
pricing 
development 
is not accurate 
and does not 
take into 
account lower 
prices options. 
p9 
(29.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
 No Not found 2020a 
A62 The way 
statistics are 
collected 
today does not 
fit in 
monitoring the 
overall status 
of developing 
market 
p9 
(29.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
 No Not found 2020a 
72 
A63 Best possible 
transparency 
for consumer 
is achieved by 
giving the 
total price of 
the ride in 
advance 
instead of the 
price of 
example ride 
p10 
(31.), 
p10 
(33.) 
System - 
functionality 
 No Not found 2020a 
A64 Pricing 
structure 
should not be 
regulated 
p10 
(32.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p1 Yes, 
partially 
Partially in 
proposal, 
Partially in 
law 
2020a 
A65 Pricing 
regulation 
should be 
consired only 
on rides hailed 
from street 
p10 
(34.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
p1 Yes Proposal, law 2020a 
A66 In Uber's 
service the 
technology 
helps the 
driver with 
choosing 
proficient 
route, helps 
with 
communicatio
n and giving 
feedback for 
both drivers 
and 
customers. 
p10-11 
(36.) 
System - 
functionality 
 No Not found 2020a 
A67 There is no 
need for 
testing the 
driver's 
expertise in 
practise. 
Companies 
and 
dispatching 
services are 
incentivized 
enough to take 
care of the 
service quality 
p11 
(39.) 
Value - 
operational - 
rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
A68 Tightening the 
taxi driver 
exam 
requirements 
would 
increase 
unemploymen
t especially 
among 
immigrants 
and long-term 
unemployed 
p11 
(40.) 
Normative - 
transformation 
 No Not found. 
Proposed 
additional 
entrepreneur 
course 
2020a 
73 
A69 Taxi driver 
exam's 
language skill 
requirements 
should not be 
increased 
p11 
(40.) 
System - 
functionality 
 No Not found 2020a 
A70 The share of 
foreign 
language 
speaking 
people of the 
total 
population in 
capital area is 
projected to 
increase to 
23% until 
2030 
p11 
(40.) 
Diffusion - end 
user 
 No Not found 2020a 
A71 Driving Uber 
has offered 
opportunities 
for social 
climbing and 
job 
opportunities 
especially 
among 
immigrants. 
Reference to 
Uber's driver's 
unemploymen
t background 
in Portugal, 
Belgium and 
France. 
p11 
(40.) 
Implementation 
- successes 
 No Not found 2020a 
A72 Curriculum 
for drivers 
would 
increase the 
threshold to 
enter the 
market. 
Officials 
should 
investigate the 
quality of 
transportation 
more carefully 
before adding 
new 
obligations. 
p12 
(41.), 
p12 
(43.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
A73 Costs would 
increase 
significantly if 
companies 
would need to 
ensure the 
education of 
drivers on a 
level specified 
before 2018 
reform and 
p12 
(42.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
74 
would create 
artificial 
barrier to use 
multihoming. 
A74 Uber drivers 
are not 
required to 
use only Uber 
for getting 
rides. 
Regulation 
should support 
many kinds of 
working forms 
and their 
coupling 
p13 
(45.) 
Regulative - 
compliance 
 No Not found 2020a 
A75 Essential 
prerequisites 
for working 
competition 
and market 
development 
is making sure 
multihoming 
is supported. 
Monitoring 
the market 
should focus 
to this too. 
p13 
(46.) 
Value - business 
- rationale 
 No Not found 2020a 
A76 There is no 
need for 
clarifying the 
fault and 
compensation 
regulation 
p13 
(48.) 
Regulative - 
compliance 
 No Not found 2020a 
A77 There is no 
need for 
specific 
multihoming 
regulation 
because 
current 
legislation 
allows it 
already. 
Monitoring 
will ensure 
this will be 
possible in 
practice. 
p13 
(49.) 
Regulative - 
compliance 
 No Not found 2020a 
A78 The pricing 
functionality 
of Uber's 
platform is 
aligned with 
government 
proposal 
p1 Regulative - 
compliance 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
A79 There are 
situations that 
justify 
changing the 
price of the 
p1 Normative - 
moral 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
75 
journey even 
if it is agreed 
in advance 
A80 Current law 
proposal does 
not take into 
account 
situations 
where 
customer 
changes e.g. 
destination 
during 
journey. In 
cases with 
external 
changes 
emerge, 
service 
provider 
should be able 
to change a 
price. 
p1 Value - 
operational - 
rationale 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
A81 Mobility 
applications 
give 
opportunity to 
wider group 
of people to 
use 
transportation 
services 
p2 Normative - 
transformation 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
A82 Information 
sharing 
requirements 
should take 
into account 
individual 
user's interest 
and privacy 
p2 Normative - 
moral 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
A83 Information 
sharing should 
require only 
aggregated 
and periodical 
data from 
service 
providers 
p2 System - 
functionality 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
A84 Information 
sharing 
requirements 
should adhere 
GDPR 
regulation 
p2 Regulative - 
compliance 
 Unknow
n 
 2020b 
 
